Economic behavior of indigenous peoples: the Mexican case by Juan Carlos Pérez Velasco Pavón
ORI GINAL RESEARCH
Economic behavior of indigenous peoples: the Mexican
case
Juan Carlos Pe´rez Velasco Pavo´n
Received: 5 December 2013 / Revised: 14 April 2014 / Accepted: 22 July 2014 /
Published online: 20 August 2014
 The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Indigenous peoples have three features in common: their historical
heritage, their current culture and their extreme poverty. This paper presents a
hypothesis about the development of a cultural factor: indigenous people prefer to
work on a small scale. This cultural factor developed during the colonial period and
remains a part of current indigenous culture. To test the hypothesis, I elaborated a
trade model and an economic growth model that take into account the cultural
factor. As predicted, the results help to explain indigenous peoples’ poverty. This
article includes empirical evidence about Mexico’s indigenous population.
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1 Introduction
For the purposes of this article, indigenous people are defined as native or aboriginal
people. In this regard, the first thing that is important to mention is that there is no
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widely accepted, or official, definition of indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, it is
possible to identify certain characteristics in common among societies classed as
indigenous, such as the following1: (a) they have a painful history of colonialism,
which forced them to defend their land for a very long time; this struggle usually
ended in the loss of their original possessions2; (b) they have constructed their own
set of institutions and culture3, which includes the tendency to prefer non-dominant
social groups to hierarchical models; they developed a very strong attachment to
their land as well as a preference for work in small family businesses or self-
employment (especially in workshops or as land workers); and (c) in general, they
have always been found among the lowest economic levels in their countries.4
Indigenous populations are widely considered to be ‘‘rural-based farmers
engaging in small-scale production for subsistence and the market’’ (Radcliffe
et al. 2008). Most indigenous peoples are primarily small-scale land workers,
fishers, herders, hunters or gatherers in nearby forests (Lasimbang 2008). Others
work in manufacturing, as weavers, carpenters or other skilled tradespeople. In fact,
evidence indicates that indigenous individuals are more often self-employed than
non-indigenous individuals.5 Since indigenous people have worked on a small scale
for centuries, they do not think about small-scale labor as a temporary trend or the
result of some structural variable; small-scale work is part of their culture, as are
communal resources, self-governance and the prevalence of non-dominant groups,
to mention a few of the most important cultural characteristics.
As a subset of the indigenous world, native Mexicans have had a history of
colonization, which has defined and shaped their current culture; this, in turn,
strongly influences their economic behavior. In Mexico, according to language
criteria, about 6 % of the population of 5 years of age or older are considered
indigenous, or 6.3 million people. The communities with the highest number of
inhabitants are the Nahuas (descendants of the Aztecs or Mexicas), the Mayas of the
Yucata´n Peninsula, the Tzeltal–Tzotzil or Mayas from Chiapas, and the Zapotecs
and Mixtecs of Oaxaca, which together constitute just under 70 % of the indigenous
1 For a complete description of the situation of indigenous peoples, country by country, see Hall and
Patrinos (2006, 2010), and Patrinos and Skoufias (2007): for the United States, see Anderson and Parker
(2009).
2 For this topic, see Simons and Malmgren (2008).
3 In fact, when researchers describe indigenous groups, they include both their historical experience and
culture. For more information about this relationship, see Kingsbury (1998), Anderson et al. (2006),
Peredo and Anderson (2006), Patrinos and Skoufias (2007).
4 For a description of poverty in indigenous communities, see Cornell and Kalt (2000), Anderson and
Parker (2009), Patrinos and Skoufias (2007), Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994), Hall and Patrinos
(2006).
5 Some studies that provide evidence for indigenous people being self-employed more often than non-
indigenous people are: for Samoa, Chan (2008); for Vietnam, Hai-Anh (2010); for Bolivia, Jime´nez Pozo
et al. (2010); for Ethiopia, Getinet Astatike (2008); for Guatemala, Patrinos and Skoufias (2007). There
are also many works on the economic situation of indigenous peoples of Canada, the United States,
Australia and New Zealand; however, unemployment benefits and other concessions from governments
have led to certain distortions to economic decisions. Furthermore, there is also a vast literature about
ethnicity and self-employment, addressing cultural traits and constraints. The great majority of those
studies, though, are about migrants in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, and/or they are
about non-indigenous peoples, such as Latinos, Asians, etc.
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population. The main economic activity for Mexican indigenous people is
agriculture, which employs 45 % of the indigenous economically active population
(EAP). In Mexico, the overall self-employment rate in the manufacturing sector is
16 %, but among the indigenous population it is 40 %. The manufacturing sectors
with the highest self-employment rates among the indigenous population are textiles
(68 %), furniture (51 %), clothing (42 %) and food (42 %). Finally, according to the
Economic Marginalization Index, more than 50 % of indigenous municipalities6
experience the highest degree of marginalization, and almost all (93 %) have at least
a high degree marginalization, compared with 14 and 47 %, respectively, across the
country. Needless to say, these groups are located in the poorest parts of Mexico.
This paper has two main goals. First, it presents a hypothesis regarding the
development of a cultural factor that induces indigenous peoples to work on a small
scale: indigenous peoples prefer workshop discipline (lack of hierarchy and work
with little or no division of labor; for example, a craftsperson in a family workshop)
to factory discipline (hierarchy and division of labor; for example, a worker on a
production line). This is due to colonialism and other historical circumstances that
indigenous peoples experienced. Second, the paper describes the effects of the
aforementioned cultural factor on economic behavior, using a trade model and an
economic growth model, the results of which help explain the current poverty of
indigenous peoples. The paper includes empirical evidence about the indigenous
Mexican population to support all arguments.
The article is, hence, structured as follows: after the introduction, I present a
definition of culture and a description of the way to introduce cultural factors into
the utility and production functions. Next, I demonstrate the hypothesis that the
history of indigenous peoples is related to their current situation. In the following
two sections, I develop models of trade and economic growth, and finally, I provide
some brief conclusions.
2 Formal models of culture
It is uncommon to use formal models to analyze the relationship between culture
and economics, the main reason being that the very concept of culture is ambiguous.
Therefore, though I will initially use a widely accepted definition of culture, later on
I will specify the cultural factor that interests us in a very precise form, so that the
factor can be included in utility and production functions.
It can be said, as per Gelles and Levine (1995), that most definitions of culture
have a common element: culture is a set of factors shared by a society, especially
beliefs and values, as well as norms, traditions, symbols, language and technology.
This definition has been used in several studies, as its broad meaning allows scholars
to use their own criteria to determine shared factors, with beliefs and values being
the most common.
Now, it is necessary to analyze and dissect the culture of the population under
study to find specific patterns that affect economic behavior. For example, the
6 Indigenous municipalities are defined as those in which at least 70 % of the population are indigenous.
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influence of the ‘‘beliefs’’ factor on the labor supply is too general and difficult to
research, as there are many beliefs; however, it is possible to analyze the effects of
specific beliefs—such as the belief that there is divine forgiveness in life—on
compliance with business agreements and contracts, as Blum and Dudley (2001)
have done. In the case of our paper, the cultural factor is that indigenous people
prefer to work on a small scale, or indigenous people prefer workshop discipline to
factory discipline. This concept is specific enough to be included in a mathematical
model. In this case, the utility function that I am going to use is the following:
u x; y; Zð Þ ð1Þ
where uðÞ is a continuous, monotonic and strictly quasiconcave utility function, x is
a vector representing a bundle of goods and services, y is a cultural factor and Z is a
number reflecting the intensity with which individuals adhere to the cultural factor,
with Z ¼ 0 meaning that the factor has no effect. The cultural factor y is a
parameter, and it affects preferences for bundles of goods and services. The
development of the cultural factor over time is explained in the next section.
3 Cultural factor: workshop discipline versus factory discipline
Before the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain, most people were employed in
family workshops; in other words, they controlled their own pace, timing and
behavior at work, and traditional family roles determined the division of labor.
During and after the Industrial Revolution, factories paved the way for radical
change, enabling employers to dictate how and when work was to be done (Clark
1994). The introduction of factories led to numerous cultural changes, including
variations in family roles and also some family traditions (Hareven 1991; Smelser
1959; Weisdorf 2006), as well as changes in the way people worked, such as
schedules and hierarchies. The tasks assigned to individuals could be very specific,
so factories could take advantage of economies of scale.
Factory discipline is essential to the economy. Nevertheless, the change from
workshop discipline to factory discipline has had a social cost, as it has led to
changes in family roles, the loss of some traditions, and fixed schedules and
hierarchies. For example, during the Industrial Revolution in Britain, there was a stir
of public resentment about labor conditions. Parliamentary reform and the new
economic structure brought about an increase in destruction of property and strikes.
Today, however, most British workers (both white and blue collar) accept factory
discipline and have forgotten many of the traditions that their ancestors followed
when working in family workshops.
But indigenous communities have not gone through this cultural change. Rather,
they have undergone other cultural changes that are reflected in their current
economic behavior. Indigenous peoples experienced a long period of attacks by
other societies, both indigenous and non-indigenous, who invaded their commu-
nities and took away most of their land; in some cases, they were forced to live a
lifestyle that was wholly in conflict with their customs. Unlike landless Brits at the
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time of the Industrial Revolution, who had the opportunity to adapt to the new
situation, indigenous communities had no choice but to produce large amounts of
public goods for a long period (to provide defense against attacks, to support passive
opposition, etc.), and they had to use certain strategies that eventually became part
of their culture.
There are several theories about the relationship between culture and the
economic behavior of indigenous peoples (see Cancian 1989; Carrier 2005; Patrinos
and Skoufias 2007; Wilk 1996). However, I am mainly interested in egalitarian
norms. Egalitarian norms are all social beliefs, social values, traditions or rules
(culture) aimed at reducing economic differences between the families in a
community. According to Platteau (2000, 2009), egalitarian norms developed for
three reasons: first, these kinds of rules were efficient in nomadic or agricultural
societies with no land scarcity; second, they were needed to deal with risk
collectively; and, finally, they supported the strong belief that human beings are part
of nature.
In the next section, I will describe the process by which Mexican indigenous
societies, who have shared a history of colonization, developed defensive strategies
through the production of public goods, and how these strategies, over time, became
part of their culture. This process is common to all indigenous communities.
3.1 Hypotheses on the development of egalitarian norms in the case
of the Mexican indigenous population
The economic history of the largest surviving indigenous communities in Mexico,
which are those considered in this paper, can be broadly summarized in terms of two
phenomena. The first is the transition from a centrally planned economy with some
economic specialization in the pre-Hispanic period (Carrasco 1977; Gibson 1964;
Soustelle 1962) to a homogeneous economy without economic specialization in the
Colonial period. The second is the presence in both the pre-Hispanic and Colonial
periods of an economy whose objective was not economic growth through
specialization, but rather the defense of territory and the reduction of an excessive
tax burden. As such, indigenous peoples incorporated defensive strategies, such as a
homogenous economy, into their culture. This led to economic stagnation, which
appears to have begun during the Colonial period and continues to the present.
3.1.1 Brief history of indigenous communities
The following description7 is about the central region of Mexico, in particular the
Mexica (also known as Aztec) economy. Further on, we address the other
communities analyzed in this article.
7 For this and the subsequent sections, I use the following bibliography for each community: Acosta
Ma´rquez (2007), Ba´ez (2004), Barrientos Lo´pez (2004), Carreo´n Flores (2007), Coronel Ortiz (2006),
Esperanza (2007), Flores Lo´pez (2006), Gallardo Arias (2004), Garcı´a and Martı´nez Sa´nchez (2007),
Go´mez Mun˜oz (2004), (Luna Ruiz 2007a, b), Mendoza et al. (2006), Mindek (2003), Monzoy Gutierrez
(2006), Moreno et al. (2006), Obrego´n Rodrı´guez (2003), Questa and Utrilla (2006), Ruiz (2006), Valle
Esquivel and Herna´ndez Alvarado (2006), Valle Esquivel (2003) and Wacher Rodarte (2006).
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In the pre-Hispanic period, the Mexica economy revolved around the govern-
ment, which controlled the resources (land and work) and determined a significant
amount of production and distribution of wealth (Carrasco 1977). There was
commercial exchange within urban centers, in public markets, as well as wholesale
trade between cities. Government income was based on tributes payed by the
Mexica lay people and peoples under Mexica occupation. Indigenous lords or
caciques8, the nobility that governed the occupied peoples with the support of the
central government, collected the tributes. Furthermore, government funds were
used to provide for the king, his court, his relatives and the caciques, and to build
temples and other public buildings.
As such, economic specialization already existed. People worked in tax
collection, government, production and distribution (Carrasco 1977). Economic
specialization was concentrated in urban centers, near the palaces and markets,
where there were carpenters, masons, tanners, potters and so forth, some with their
own guilds (Soustelle 1962). There was far-reaching trade with people specialized
in wholesaling, who traveled great distances in caravans. Over time, this trade led
some communities to specialize in the production of certain articles (Hardoy 1999).
In sum, there were specialists and clients for their products—and not just within the
empire—, and there was a constant supply of basic goods and products, as well as a
market network that continuously ordered these elements (Martinez Veiga 1990).
However, this was not the case in rural areas or small towns, where most people
lived, many of them subjugated. They had to pay heavy tribute, so there were no
incentives for economic efficiency. In these cases, division of labor only occurred
within the family, based on age and gender.
In the pre-Hispanic period, the economic situation of the other indigenous
peoples was varied. There is abundant evidence that the Mayas were a developed
people who engaged in economic specialization, as the multiple ruins of their
empire suggest. The Mixtecs and especially the Zapotecs (Oaxaca) had large-scale
trade, division of labor and economic specialization. However, in general, the other
peoples were less advanced. There is no indication of significant economic
development among the Chol, Tzeltal or Tzotzil peoples; rather, they were
backward communities. Evidence points to a lack of economic specialization among
the Mazahua and Otomi peoples. For their part, the Pure´pechas had little economic
development, with the exception of certain urban regions.
Despite their differences, all the indigenous communities wound up being
subjugated by the Spanish. Subjugation was due to war, alliances and betrayals,
epidemics or a combination of the two. In the end, despite differences in the ways
they were conquered, all the communities can be said to share the same story of
abuse.
For their part, the Mazahua and Otomi peoples had been conquered by the
Mexicas and paid them tribute. In fact, these communities helped the Spanish to
defeat the Mexicas, to then be subjugated by the Spanish. The Mixtecs and Zapotecs
received the Spanish very positively, but after a series of battles and violent revolts,
8 A cacique is a person who exercises abusive power over a community or group. The word was initially
used to refer to Caribbean chieftains, and this use was then extended to Mexico and Central America.
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they ended up subjugated. The Chol, Tzeltal and Tzotzil peoples faced their
conquerors with great violence. However, after several revolts, these peoples were
also subjugated, although they continued to rebel afterwards, without success.
Despite their advances, the conquest of the Mayan people was relatively simple, as
in this period Mayan civilization was already decimated. Lastly, the Pure´pechas
were never defeated in the pre-Hispanic era, as Pure´pecha communities were
designed for efficient defense against attacks. However, they were conquered by the
Spanish after the Mexicas were.
During the colonial period, which lasted from the sixteenth century until the
beginning of the nineteenth century, urban centers were established in different
parts of modern-day Mexico. Some of these were located on the sites of ancient
indigenous settlements, while other were new, founded near mines or to ease trade.
In these urban centers, the economy depended on craftspeople, who erected
buildings and public works; in other words, economic specialization continued.
However, it is important to mention that in general, Spain’s strategy for its colonies
was to prohibit or at least hinder the production of consumer goods, to stimulate
industry on the Iberian Peninsula and to monopolize trade, which reduced the
incentives toward greater economic specialization (Garcı´a Martı´nez 1977). Never-
theless, little by little the populations of these cities increased, in large part due to
settlement by indigenous people from the countryside. Together, natives, Spaniards,
criollos, mestizos and other inhabitants formed a new colonial society and, later on,
urban Mexican society.
However, the history of indigenous communities in rural areas was dissimilar.
The main form of production during the beginning of the colonial period was the
encomiendas, in which entire groups of indigenous people were appropriated to
privileged conquistadors, called encomenderos, who had the right to demand tribute
and labor from these indigenous people (Gibson 1964). The collection of tributes in
the encomiendas followed the same pattern as in the pre-Hispanic period, using
caciques and bureaucracy, which led to the functional collection structure in New
Spain being practically identical to that which had existed in the pre-Hispanic era
(Garcı´a Martı´nez 1977).
The Spanish Crown appointed several changes, to reduce abuse of indigenous
people. Among these changes, the Crown modified personal services, which were
controlled by functionaries, and each town came to an agreement about provision of
services (Garcı´a Martı´nez 1977). The form of rural government also changed, with
the introduction of the so-called Republics of Indians. This led to greater
independence of indigenous communities and to their administration paralleling
that of Castilian communities (Garcı´a Martı´nez 1977). Also, the Crown recognized
indigenous peoples as vassals of the king, so that they now had obligations and
rights, such as the right to a justice system.
Over time, the encomiendas began to change into agricultural and ranching
businesses. When new businesses formed or existing ones expanded, they demanded
land, including that owned by indigenous peoples. In addition, as population
increased, there were more mestizos, Spaniards and criollos, who preferred to live
on small plantations; thus, demand for land grew even more. The more open system
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of justice and the increased demand for land were the key factors in determining the
development of many indigenous communities.
The development of indigenous communities was varied. Some had economic
success, adapting to the new forms of production and changing their lifestyles, until
they were completely integrated and lost their identity as indigenous peoples
(Garcı´a Martı´nez 1977). Epidemics practically eliminated some communities,
leaving very few survivors to integrate themselves into other groups. There was also
widespread migration of indigenous people from their communities to other areas,
mainly in search of opportunities in haciendas, mines, cities or the new companies
in the north; however, some people migrated to avoid the ever greater obligations
demanded of indigenous communities (Garcı´a Martı´nez 1977; Ruiz 1997), which I
explain later on.
However, indigenous communities mainly focused on defending their rights, like
the nullification of personal services, tax reduction, autonomy and, especially,
defense of their lands in light of growing demand. To do so they adopted different
strategies, mainly using the legal system. Ruiz Medrano (2010) has conducted a
broad study of the legal strategies used by indigenous communities, from the
Colonial era to the present. In general terms, these communities initially relied
extensively on intermediaries (missionaries, royal functionaries, lawyers, interpret-
ers and mixed-race individuals) for representation. However, indigenous people
gradually learned to understand the legal system and demanded that their customs
and practices be respected9, which they achieved.
Communities adopted a communal defense strategy to pool resources and be
recognized as a group with legitimate practices and customs. However, for this
strategy to succeed and for communities to retain their lands, communities needed
to facilitate and democratize internal decisions, and to minimize the success of
tactics used by their opponents in trials, which essentially meant bribing or coming
to terms with the caciques and lords (Lira and Muro 1977). Facilitating and
democratizing decision making, as well as minimizing internal treachery, were clear
incentives for communities to begin to change their internal organization. Lords and
caciques disappeared, and communities began to work collectively, including in
economic terms. Some characteristics of communities at this time were that they
had communal savings chests and no longer had to provide personal services,
though they payed the crown a tribute of a percentage of their community’s
production. Little by little indigenous peoples began to work independently and
communally (p. 290).
The situation described in the above paragraphs first presented itself in the central
region, where the Mexicas, Mazahuas and Otomies lived. Later on, with some local
variations, indigenous communities in the Yucata´n Peninsula, Oaxaca, Chiapas and
the other places also decided to defend their rights. In fact, indigenous communities
became, in the words of Garcı´a Martı´nez (1977), experts at disputes, both legal and
9 At this point, it is important to note the possibility that indigenous communities made their legal
strategies into traditions. This has occurred in other communities, which invented traditions in reaction to
different situations. See Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992).
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extralegal, which sometimes even led to violence; according to Viceroy Enrı´quez,
disputes were the main weapon of indigenous communities.
The new form of internal organization in indigenous communities included a sui
generis system of government. This system of government has been widely studied
by historians and anthropologists, who have not been able to agree if it was
developed internally or imposed on communities. This is known as the cargo or
mayordomı´a system. However, as we will see later on, this elaborate system was
complemented by others, among which the tendency toward lack of economic
specialization is especially notable.
In simplified terms, the cargo system, which still exists, is a scheme that requires
certain members of a community (generally men) to meet regularly (usually once a
year) to perform various functions, such as serving as judges, representatives,
coordinators or other officials. These functions are usually religious, but they can
also be administrative, economic and legal. Posts are generally prestigious but
unpaid, so that individuals have a positive incentive to hold them (being part of the
hierarchy and fulfilling a duty), as well as a strong negative incentive (lack of pay).
There has been intense debate over the origins and purpose of this system10, since in
addition to being a hierarchical system with counterincentives toward service, it
could also be a leveler of income, if communities select the members with the
greatest income, so that at the end of the period they have less income and are on par
with everyone else. The system first arose in the Center, and then spread to
Michoaca´n, Oaxaca and finally Chiapas (Chance and Taylor 1985).
On the other hand, the indigenous economic system has not been widely studied.
However, we can suppose that economic organization was contingent on achieving
the main goal, the defense of autonomy—the defense the land and freedom from
taxes, personal services and other impositions. This led labor to be organized in a
way similar to how government was, in cooperatives for working the land, with
changing authority, avoidance of a specialized economy, use of traditional
technology (Gonzalez 1996) and a homogenization of internal production of goods.
I will analyze this further on.
After Independence, toward the middle of the nineteenth century, the new liberal
governments in power tried to promote legal equality and economic growth. To
promote legal equality, they set up municipalities, so that everyone living in an area
(natives, criollos, Spaniards, etc.) would have the same local government. To
foment economic growth, they encouraged indigenous communities to adopt private
property and expropriate unused land, including communal land (Bailon 1999).
The internal structure of indigenous communities proved to be very flexible.
Communities were able to mobilize the people (Reina 1996, 2009), change their
names or join a municipality to retain autonomy (Gonzalez 1996). Because these
strategies were adaptable, even though policies were different in liberal Mexico and
conservative Guatemala, indigenous communities in both countries were able to
defend their rights and retain their autonomy.
The demand for indigenous lands began to grow again when the liberals left
power and the conservative period began. The haciendas, which were supported by
10 For a summary of the debate, see: Chance and Taylor (1985).
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the government, were now demanding land, and entire indigenous communities
sometimes lived within a hacienda. However, communities continued to defend
their rights assiduously. According to Ruiz (1997), one of their strategies was to
agree to work on the hacienda, but to organize themselves communally as before.
After the Revolution, agrarian reform expropriated land from the owners of the
haciendas and divided it among the laborers. This led to the creation of the ejidos,
which were communal lands owned by the state but to which the peasants had right
of usufruct. Evidently, indigenous communities once again used codices and written
accounts as strategies to recover their lands, with great success. The distribution of
land began during the Revolution and continued until the 1970s. Also, communities
have been able to adapt to different governments, making agreements that enable
them to remain autonomous.
In 1994, the Zapatista Revolution began in the South of Mexico (in the state of
Chiapas). It is interesting to note that some of the communal negotiation strategies
that indigenous communities used in nineteenth century were similar to those used
in negotiations toward the end of the twentieth century, in particular, that important
decisions needed to be discussed internally.
3.1.2 The production of public goods
As can be seen in the previous section, the history of indigenous communities has
been varied, but many communities have worked to defend their rights to their lands
and reduce tax burdens, in addition to defending their lifestyles, especially in the
nineteenth century. Communal defense is a public good; the more members of a
community participate, and the more efficiently they do so, the more effective
communal defense will be, and all members can enjoy it equally. Obviously, the
production of this type of goods is problematic, because of decision-making costs
(everyone must participate in production to enjoy the good, so it is essential to
decide what resources the use, when, how, etc.), organizational costs (assigning and
coordinating responsibilities) and supervisory costs (as they are clear incentives to
reduce participation in production, since consumption is the same for all). However,
it is widely known that the market solution (to let the market solve the provision of
defense) is inefficient.
Nevertheless, there is a positive association between ethnic homogeneity or
egalitarian communities and the provision of public goods (Habyarimana et al.
2007). This is because, from a theoretical standpoint and in the case of the
egalitarian community, is more likely that all members of the community know the
optimum roles of all community members (Pareto optimality), so theoretical
solutions are easy to implement. For example, according to Salanie´ (2000), the vote
is effective when the marginal rate of substitution for the representative agent is
equal to the average of the marginal rates of substitution for all agents, which is the
case when we have perfect economic equality. In the cases of the Lindahl’s
equilibrium taxes and the Groves mechanism (Luenberger 1995), the problem is
information, since the participants have incentives to falsify information. In this
sense, some papers have analyzed the problems that cooperatives face when they
need to make decisions (MacLeod 2013; Dow and Putterman 2000). In fact, several
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experiments confirm that the more homogeneous the community, the easier it is to
produce public goods (Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000; Reuben and Riedl 2013).
3.1.3 Egalitarian norms in Mexican indigenous communities
To reduce the costs of internal decision making, as well as to assign, coordinate and
supervise defense tasks, indigenous communities created and/or adapted a series of
strategies. The most widely known (and the most visible) is, of course, the cargo
system, which was explained in the previous section and has been studied by a
numbers of historians and anthropologists.11 According to Greenberg (1981), who
has performed in situ anthropological work, there can be no doubt that the cargo
system is a norm that levels income, in particular, as Chance and Taylor (1985)
note, when the financing of religious celebrations is considered. However, there are
different points of view concerning the origin of the cargo system; there is doubt if it
was developed by indigenous communities as an internal strategy, or if it was
imposed upon communities from the outside by the Church or the owners of the
haciendas.12 Also, the cargo system has been complemented by a structure of
familial and non-familial relationships—the latter due to religious bonds13—that
implies a more intense type of cooperation than simple relationships between
community members.
A system of government with these characteristics cannot be separate from the
economic system. In particular, it would be ill advised to try to combine a
government based on the cargo system with a system of economic freedom. A
society cannot combine a system of government that tries to avoid economic, social
and political inequality and encourages the use of temporary hierarchies, with a
system of production and distribution that includes incentives toward economic
inequality and medium- and long-term hierarchies.
It is possible to conceive a way to achieve economic efficiency and at the same
time reduce the costs of decision making and supervision. Certainly, between the
sixteenth century and the middle of the twentieth century, indigenous communities
attempted to find a way several times, but there is no record of any community
having succeeded. On this topic, historians have only described the form of work in
indigenous towns as communal for agricultural production, and as family
enterprises for the manufacture of goods. They have also described certain norms,
like the faena (a system for exchanging work instead of money), for assisting
neighbors and building public works. In sum, in different places and at different
times, Mexican and Mesoamerican indigenous communities developed egalitarian
norms to minimize the problems of collective decision making and organization,
and to make the production of public goods more efficient, especially in terms of
obtaining resources and producing strategies for legal defense of their lands.
11 See a survey in: Chambers and Young (1979) and Chance and Taylor (1985).
12 This debate among anthropologists may have been influenced by the substantivist and rationalist
schools of anthropological theory.
13 For this topic, see Bloch and Guggenheim (1981), Coy (1974), Sanders and Nee (1996). For the actual
papers about kinship, see Hoff and Sen (2005) and Hoff and Pandey (2004).
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A literature search14 revealed all the indigenous communities considered in this
paper:
• Use the cargo system, including those that are municipal seats, where they
combine civil service with traditional offices; however, in some groups,
community members who have emigrated and work outside the community
finance religious ceremonies, though concrete data are not available.
• Produce agricultural goods communally, or at least appear to do so, using a
system of ejidos or communal lands, with a rotating hierarchy (a practice that
overlaps with the cargo system in some cases).
• Produce manufactures that do not require economic specialization, like crafts, in
family businesses. The literature only revealed one case of some economic
specialization, in a Mayan textile community in the state of Quintana Roo,
where the most experienced women perform the most difficult embroidery.
There is also evidence of cooperatives to foment trade, or production
cooperatives, but members usually only share a space and do not take advantage
of economies of scale.
As we can see in the previous section, the history of indigenous communities has
been varied. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that the communities that have
survived to this day are those that have dedicated themselves to the defense of their
lands and the reduction of tax burdens, as well as the defense of their lifestyle
beginning in the nineteenth century, and that adopted egalitarian norms (communal
land, cargo system of government and small-scale craft production). This does not
mean that all communities that adopted these norms have survived, but rather that
those that survived all follow these norms as a part of their daily life.
However, these days, the goal of egalitarian norms is no longer clear. On the
contrary, indigenous communities currently demand that they be allowed to follow
their customs and practices, which are precisely egalitarian norms. Thus, everything
seems to indicate that these norms are now a part of indigenous culture. The
repetition of a strategy used over several generations can become a part of culture—
through beliefs, values and institutions—and, ultimately, also a part of the utility
function.15 This idea is reinforced by two points: first, indigenous communities have
a very strong link to the past, because they are gerontocratic or pre-figurative
societies (as defined by Margaret Mead 1972), and older generations tend to be
resistant to change; second, the strategy has been incorporated into traditions,
customs, taboos and/or myths (as in the case of religious traditions), which also
makes cultural changes more complicated. Egalitarian norms are complemented by
other customs, such as the cargo system in Mexico or the big-man system, present in
some Asian indigenous communities (Sahlinis and Marshall 1963). Both systems
14 See endnote 1.
15 For example, Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992) analyze the relationship between strategy and tradition.
For transmission of culture, see Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). For cultural tradition and collective
memory, see Dessı´ (2008).
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avoid personal privilege, and the emergence of a power group is less likely, whereas
there is a widespread reliance on kinship systems (Mesoamerica and Africa).16
If a style of work, such as working on a small scale with no economic
specialization outside of the family, is integrated into beliefs and traditions, then it
becomes a part of the culture, a factor shared by the community. It is in this sense
that I argue that indigenous communities have a social preference for working on a
small scale, using workshop discipline, without economic specialization.
Even though communal ownership of resources could imply some lack of
efficiency, it also ensures equality, since the community controls resources. There is
much literature about communal resources, especially since Hardin published his
paper ‘‘The Tragedy of the Commons’’ in 1968. Nonetheless, the cultural factor of
preference for work on a small scale could also imply a lack of hierarchy and,
consequently, the absence of economic specialization, with traditional technologies
and the inability of the community to build large factories. In other words, people
prefer workshop discipline to factory discipline. For this paper, I take discipline to
mean behavior in accordance with standards of conduct; thus, factory discipline is
complying with hierarchies, rigid schedules, division of labor and so forth, while
workshop discipline is understood as the absence of predefined conditions. Factory
discipline applies to work in industrial plants, production lines and mass production,
while workshop discipline applies to individual work, family work and work in
small groups. It is worth noting that this definition of discipline is independent of the
intensity or duration of work. The Cultural Factor promotes the development of
family businesses and/or self-employment. Henceforth, in the rest of paper, the
Cultural Factor, work on a small scale and workshop discipline will be used as
synonyms.
The next section presents evidence about the persistence of the Cultural Factor in
indigenous communities in Mexico. Section 4 discusses the effects of the Cultural
Factor on economic behavior and material welfare in terms of trade, and Sect. 5
discusses these effects in terms of economic growth.
3.2 Empirical evidence for egalitarian norms in Mexico today
Since self-employment enables workshop discipline, I have used self-employment
as an indication of the Cultural Factor, i.e., as the empirical proxy of the Cultural
Factor. One or more unpaid helpers, usually relatives, may perhaps assist self-
employed individuals. The complement of this concept is factory discipline or work
on a large scale, which is defined as any work involving no family hierarchies. It is
important to note here that the term factory discipline should not be understood as a
military-style discipline, but rather only as a style of work where hierarchy is not
determined by family structure; instead, structures are developed to complete
specialized work, as in the case of office work (public or private), factory work and
so forth.
16 For this topic, see Bloch and Guggenheim (1981), Coy (1974), Sanders and Nee (1996). For the actual
papers about kinship, see Hoff and Sen (2005) and Hoff and Pandey (2004).
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The data I used in this and other empirical analyses were taken from the General
Census of Population and Housing, carried out by the Instituto Nacional de
Estadı´stica, Geografı´a e Informa´tica (INEGI, National Institute of Statistics and
Geography) in 2010. The questionnaire applied by the interviewers included
information relevant to our study, namely the type of work that individuals perform
and if individuals belong to an indigenous group.
To determine if a person works on a small scale or not, I used a specific census
question, in which the people surveyed had to define themselves as self-employed or
unpaid helpers (workshop discipline), versus employees, day laborers (jornaleros),
employers or paid helpers (factory discipline). On the other hand, individuals are
defined as indigenous if they reported that they speak an indigenous language.17
Table 1 shows the main activities of the EAP in Mexico, in accordance with the
criteria of the type of work that I just defined. Total work on a small scale is the sum
of columns (1) to (4), where column (1) refers to land work, which includes the case
of subsistence agriculture.18 Column (5) indicates the percentage of the EAP
working as employees, land workers, employers or paid helpers. It is important to
note that, for Mexico as a whole, the percentage of work on a small scale is 28.6 %,
with 24.7 % corresponding to self-employment and the rest corresponding to unpaid
work; work outside of the family hierarchy comprises the other 71.4 %. Because
80.1 % of the indigenous communities are located in rural areas (communities of up
to 15,000 inhabitants), I have also included the data for these areas. The percentage
of self-employed workers and unpaid helpers is 31.1 % overall in rural areas, versus
58.7 % for indigenous communities located in rural areas.
To analyze the possible existence of the Cultural Factor within indigenous
communities, I performed two empirical analyses. Both of the analyses compare the
type of work in indigenous communities with that in non-indigenous populations.
3.2.1 Contrasts in self-employment rates
Our first approach to knowing whether or not the Cultural Factor affects the
behavior of indigenous communities was extra-economic. I simply contrasted the
rates of self-employment and unpaid help in indigenous and non-indigenous
populations under similar economic conditions. The similarity of economic
condition is very important, because economic conditions may affect the decision
to become self-employed, or vice versa. The control group was made up of all
families that live in rural areas of the six states with the largest percentages of
indigenous inhabitants: Campeche, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Oaxaca, Guerrero and
Yucata´n. Individuals in these communities are not involved in banking activities
and, therefore, they are unaffected by liquidity restrictions and the price of bank
loans. Furthermore, both indigenous and non-indigenous groups deal with similar
17 The census also records self-ascription, that is, if a person is self-defined as indigenous. These data
were not used in this work.
18 Subsistence agriculture is understood in this paper as the production of corn and beans, two basic
elements of the Mexican diet that are also a mainstay of the indigenous diet. Producing corn and beans on
a small scale is not economically profitable, but it is a survival strategy in cases of extreme poverty;
basically, the family consumes the products and the surplus is sold in local markets.
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aggregate variables (unemployment, price levels, etc.). Finally, only bilingual
(Spanish and dialect speakers) indigenous individuals were chosen to avoid any
influence that language discrimination may have.
In the rural areas of the six aforementioned states, the percentage of the non-
indigenous EAP defined as self-employed or as unpaid helpers is 36.7 %, which is
statistically lower than the indigenous rate of 52.4 %. The same contrast is present
in the manufacturing sector (see Table 2).
3.2.2 Analysis of factors that determine self-employment
A second approach is to analyze the factors affecting self-employment, and examine
when and under what circumstances indigenous ethnicity is one of these factors.
This analysis does not include unpaid helpers, since other family members usually
influence (affect) their decision-making process.
The literature on the factors that determine self-employment19 considers the basic
characteristics of the individual (such as gender, marital status, age, education, etc.),
variables in the individual’s immediate environment (such as access to financial aid
Table 1 Types of economic activities in Mexico (%)
Small scale Non small scale
Agriculture Manufacturing crafts Trade Other
Total Subsistence agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total 7.1 3.1 13.6 5.9 2.0 71.4
Rural 15.6 6.0 10.3 3.9 1.3 68.9
Indigenous 45.1 30.2 10.2 2.5 0.9 41.3
Source: INEGI 2010
Table 2 Self-employment rate
Mean 95 % interval
Agriculture, manufacturing and trade
Indigenous 0.5236 0.5226 0.5245
Non-indigenous 0.3665 0.3657 0.3672
Manufacturing
Indigenous 0.5875 0.5839 0.5911
Non-indigenous 0.3417 0.3390 0.444
According to the statistical test, the means are statistically different
Source: INEGI 2010
19 For a complete summary, see Georgellis et al. (2005) and Parker (2004).
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and liquidity constrains) and aggregated variables (such as the country’s
unemployment rate and degree of development).
It is important to mention that there is broad evidence of major differences in the
self-employment rate based on ethnicity. Studies usually analyze the topic from two
standpoints: cultural differences and structural factors. Studies about cultural
difference mainly address religious characteristics, social skills (Clark et al. 1998),
business skills (Lucas 1978), community risk aversion (Kihlstrom and Laffont
1979) and human capital (Nee and Sanders 1996). The structural factors studied
include social networks (Masurel et al. 2002; Light et al. 2000), ethnic enclaves
(Parker 2004), discrimination when hiring persons from a given ethnic group
(Moore 1983), discrimination relating to consumption of goods produced or sold by
another ethnic group (Borjas et al. 1989), the local capital market (Blanchflower and
Oswald 1998) and strategies against discrimination, among others.
Further, a new trend in the topic has developed, indicating that self-employment
leads to greater utility than being an employee (Benz and Frey 2003, 2006;
Blanchflower and Oswald 1998). According to the authors, this is because of the
satisfaction individuals experience due to flexible working schedules, autonomy and
lack of hierarchy.
The analysis presented below combines the idea that cultural differences are a
factor in self-employment with the idea that self-employment provides greater
utility than being an employee does. The reason is that we are assuming that the
Cultural Factor, which is a cultural bias toward self-employment, is an argument in
the utility function.
I performed four Logit regressions to verify if Mexican indigenous people have
an extra-economic tendency toward self-employment. In these regressions, the
dependent variable is a dummy that identifies self-employment status (1 for self-
employment, 0 for the other case). The independent variables are divided into the
following: personal information (age, marital status, number of children and
educational levels); close environment variables (size of the locality); variables that
reflect the economic sector and a variable that indicates the ethnic status (1 if speak
indigenous language, that is, if person is indigenous, 0 for the other case). As I
explained in Sect. 3.2, the data correspond to the 2010 Census in Mexico. The
results are presented in Table 3. Note that the data prove the hypothesis, given the
statistical significance and positive correlation of ethnic status.
Moreover, the table includes regressions for the total EAP and the population
working in the secondary (or manufacturing) sector. I have included data on the
secondary sector because models introduced later on (about trade and economic
growth) use the concept of economies of scale. The degree of economies of scale in
the agricultural sector, in which the vast majority of indigenous people is employed,
is unclear; that is, it is difficult to distinguish between agricultural products with and
without economies of scale. However, in the manufacturing sector, products with
low or no economies of scale are crafts, and, as I a saw in the previous section, these
are the manufactures produced by indigenous communities.
The first and third columns of Table 3 show the results of two regressions, one
containing people working in all sectors (agricultural, manufacturing and commer-
cial), and the other including only those who work in the secondary sector. The
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results show that the variables representing personal characteristics are all
significant, as are those variables related to a person’s immediate environment
and those associated with each sector. The variable related to ethnicity has positive
values and is statistically significant.
To ensure that comparisons were made between people in similar environments,
as well as to avoid endogeneity problems and to control unseen variables (mainly
survival strategies), and given that the economies of indigenous communities have a
high degree of marginalization, I included a control group restricted to individuals
(indigenous or not) who live in similar conditions. The control group is similar to
that for the first empirical analysis, as it is made up of individuals that live in rural
areas of the six states with largest percentage of indigenous inhabitants. The results
are similar for the total sample and the control group.
Finally, the last column shows the results of a regression where the dependent
variable is comprised of people who hire workers (i.e., they are entrepreneurs). In
this case, the correlation with indigenous ethnicity is negative, which is the expected
sign given the Cultural Factor.
To identify the influence of the Cultural Factor for each indigenous community,
Table 4 disaggregates the results for the five regressions presented in Table 3 for the
16 main indigenous communities in Mexico. All the regressions contain a dummy
variable for each community (1 if a person speaks an indigenous language, 0 for the
other case). Table 4 only presents the results corresponding to the analyzed
communities. The results for the other variables (personal information, immediate
environment and economic sector) are not included, since they are very similar to
those reported in Table 3. Also, the penultimate row communicates the p value to
test if, as a whole, the estimated parameters are different from zero.
To facilitate the interpretation of the estimated parameters, in Table 4, the
indigenous communities are arranged according to their degree of traditionalism,
with the first communities being the most traditional. To determine traditionalism, I
used the Ethnolinguistic Replacement Index (ERI; see Ordorica et al. 2009). ERI
measures the tendency of the new generations of an ethnolinguistic group to
continue to use the group’s language. ERI ranges from 0 to 2, where 2 indicate an
increase in the use of the language, while 0 is a rapid trend toward loss of the
language. ERI is important because it indicates the influence of tradition within
communities (a higher ERI means that customs and traditions are more influential
and, therefore, so is the Cultural Factor we are analyzing); it is also is independent
of current income and current economic conditions. Further, if we arrange
communities according to their degree of traditionalism, we can divide them into
three groups, where the first is the most traditional and the last the least traditional.
The Groups are as follows: Group 1: Tlapanecs, Tzotzils, Tzeltals and Chols; Group
2: Huastecs, Mixtecs, Mazatecs, Chinantecs, Mixes, Nahuas and Totonacs; Group 3:
Pure´pechas, Zapotecs, Mayas, Otomies and Mazahuas. I have employed this
classification because the groups have certain common characteristics, which will
be useful throughout the empirical analysis in this article.
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that, overall, the disaggregated results
contribute new information to the regressions (all the p values in the penultimate
row tend toward zero). As expected, the estimated parameters for the first regression
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(all sectors) and the third regression (secondary sector) are positive and statistically
significant for all the indigenous communities, with only one exception, in the Chols
case (in this case, the first regression is negative and not statistically significant). It
is difficult to determine why the Chols do not conform to the general pattern,
especially because three of the first four communities (Tzeltals, Tzotzils and Chols)
live in the same state (Chiapas) and have faced similar problems: conflicts over land
tenure, religious difficulties, migration of indigenous individuals from Guatemala
and the consequences of the Zapatista rebellion. Also, the self-employment rates for
these four communities are the highest among the 16 communities analyzed, while
the hectares of land per family and the percentages of agricultural day laborers are
the lowest among the communities analyzed. According to the sources consulted for
this article, the difference between the Chols and the other communities is the
degree of difficulties experienced by the Chols, which has led to very high migration
rate, even if only to nearby communities. Thus, a large share of the Chol community
is currently landless, and Chols are employed mainly in the production of crafts.
This is why the first coefficient is not statistically significant, while the second is.
Continuing the analysis of the value of the estimated parameters, Table 5
includes a series of regressions (OLS) in which the independent variable is the
marginal change in the probability (the values of the estimated parameters from the
columns in Table 4, by community), and the dependent variable is the degree of
traditionalism, measured using ERI. There is a positive and significant correlation
between these two variables for the first three regressions from Table 4. Thus, as
traditionalism increases, self-employment—a proxy variable for the Cultural
Factor—increases. Complementing this, the second part of Table 5 includes the
results for these same regressions, but adds dummy variables for the Chol,
Pure´pecha and Zapotec communities, as well as a dummy variable for Group 2
Table 5 Relationship between self-employment and ERI
Self-employed with no hired workers
Total Secondary sector
Total sample Rural sample,
6 States
Total sample Rural sample,
6 states
Constant 0.00 -0.19 0.09* 0.00
ERI 0.11* 0.25* 0.08* 0.10
R2 0.28 0.36 0.19 0.03
Constant -0.02* -0.26* 0.04* -0.18
ERI 0.16* 0.33* 0.11* 0.22
Chols -0.18* -0.22* -0.07* -0.35*
Group 2 -0.05* – 0.04 –
Pure´pechas 0.11* 0.15 0.03 0.23
Zapotecs 0.14* – 0.15* –
R2 0.86 0.65 0.70 0.49
Source: Table 4 and ERI data (Ordorica et al. 2009)
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communities (1 if a community is part of the second group, 0 in the other case). The
reason for the dummy variable for the Chols is explained in the previous paragraph;
as I explain further on, the dummy variables for the Pure´pechas and Zapotecs are
due to the fact that these communities have adapted very well to economic changes
while maintaining a high level of self-employment, by adopting commercial crops
and trade in crafts.
Lastly, for the overall sample, the dummy variable for Group 2 has a negative
sign and is significant; however, this is not the case for the third regression. This
indicates that the parameters for this group for all sectors are lesser than those for
the secondary sector. The following interpretation helps explain this phenomenon.
In the case of the second group, the percentage of agricultural day laborers is greater
than that for the other groups, reducing self-employment; that is, in the regions
where these communities live, it is necessary to own land to be a self-employed
agricultural worker. But in the case of the first group (Chols excepted), everyone
owns land (that is, the percentage of agricultural day laborers is very low), although
usually only very small plots, and they produce their crafts on this land. In other
words, the number of hectares per family is only sufficient for subsistence
agriculture, so families produce crafts to have income.
The results are similar for the control group and the total sample; except for the
Mayas and the Chinantecs, the values are positive and statistically significant. In the
case of the Mayas, the negative values are possibly due to the fact that tourism is
very important in their region, and some tourist centers have been developed within
indigenous communities.
Given the regressions in Tables 3, 4 and 5, we can conclude that indigenous
people still have a greater degree of self-employment than non-indigenous people,
even when the communities compared are highly similar. This evidence proves that,
in indigenous communities, non-economic incentives toward self-employment do
exist. It also shows that Mexican indigenous people do exhibit the Cultural Factor
analyzed here.
4 The waste of trade benefits
Trade between societies comes mainly from two sources: economies of scale and
diversity. Economies of scale are the same for all countries, and each one takes them
to reduce costs. Diversity can come from different elements, mainly differences in
technology (Ricardo’s model) and factor endowments (Heckscher–Ohlin model);
but it can also arise from cultural differences. This is because values, beliefs and
other cultural factors may influence the production function, and the influence may
be precisely through differences in the economies of scale.
To explain the relationship between a society with the cultural factor of work on
a small scale and its external trade, I will adapt an intra-industrial trade model
(Krugman 1979). This model is adequate for analyzing cultural factors since it is
possible to use it to study families that face the dilemma of producing in association
with others families (and, thus, taking advantage of the economies of scale), or
Lat Am Econ Rev (2014) 23:12 Page 23 of 58 12
123
producing in small groups or by themselves; in this model, the focus is on the
influence of Cultural Factor on both type of trade and business size.20
4.1 The model
Suppose that a society under a regime of monopolistic competition is composed of
M identical families or individuals and N goods, where both figures are large.
Production technology for each commodity, ci with i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; N is calculated
using the following production function:
ci ¼ fi Sið Þ ð2Þ
with oci=oSið Þ[ 0 for i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; N, where Si 2 1; M½  indicates the number of
families producing the ith good. Technology is the same for all goods, except for the
degree of economies of scale, which is measured by ri, that is, output elasticity with
respect to only one input Si. In all cases, ri [ 1 and it is assumed that if ri [ rj for
one given So, it will also be for another S. In other words, I assume that if a large-
scale production process provides higher returns than a small-scale process in one
case, this applies in all cases. Also, it is assumed that output elasticity decreases




The preferences of each family j, with j ¼ 1; 2; . . .; M are represented using a utility
function such as function (1), where a cultural characteristic negatively influences




v cið Þ þ ZgðM  SiÞ ð4Þ
with v0 [ 0; v00\0. The second term is the increase in utility due to the cultural
factor of work on a small scale that causes the rejection of work in large groups,
measured with S (the greater S is, the lesser utility becomes), with og=oSð Þ\0 and
o2g=oS2
 
\0. Also, Z measures the intensity with which an individual follows the
cultural factor. The M families are completely free to join and produce any of the
goods; therefore, N would be one variable in the model. The decision of the pro-
duction group size (i.e., the size of the company) is based on both the preference (in
case Z [ 0) and the family income (p); the latter is defined as the amount of sales,
divided by the number of families producing the same good. For the case of a family
j (which belongs to a production group with other identical families) that produces
the ith good, the following restriction applies:
20 There are several determinants of firm size: economies of scale and transaction cost (Canba¨ck 1997),
financial situation (Beck et al. 2008), inflation rate (Wu and Zhang 2001); also, there is a literature about
firm size distribution (Cabral and Mata 2003; Sutton 2007). Culture as a determinant of firm size is a new
area.








The left side of the restriction equation is the income that family j received for
producing good i, and this income is defined as the production function fiðSiÞ of the
ith good, multiplied by its price (pi), and divided by the number of families (Si) that
produce this good. The right side is the family’s total expenses, where I assume, for
simplicity, that the good produced is bought on the market for consumption. Given











Intuitively we can observe that, ceteris paribus, the optimum size of the company Si
depends negatively on Z, as higher values of the variable indicate the family’s
greater aversion to producing with other individuals.
4.2 Equilibrium in the model
The Eqs. (6, 7) define the maximization program of each family. To facilitate the
analysis, I assume that: the cross-elasticity of demand of good i with regard to the
price of good j, with i 6¼ j, is negligible; the influence of the purchase of the good
produced by the representative family is also insignificant; and finally, the Lagrange
multiplier is constant with respect to the price of each product. The previous
assumptions are valid when N and M are large numbers.21 To obtain elasticity
(inverse) of the demand for a good, we must differentiate the first-order conditions
regarding the price. Note that the inverse of the elasticity depends only on the utility














with 0\gi\1 for i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; N. To establish an equilibrium, let us first consider
the case where Z ¼ 0. There are two conditions to be met: the first is that each
21 This situation is valid for the type of utility function (4). The logic is that there are so many goods that,
when there is a change in one of them, its influence on the demand of other goods is so small that there is
no reason to concentrate on it; see Dixit and Norman (2002, p. 269), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Krugman
(1979), Feenstra (2004, p. 138). The same logic implies that the influence on purchasing decisions of the
number of goods produced and sold is negligible. Finally, for the assumption of the constant Lagrange
multiplier, see Feenstra (2004).
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individual join others to form a company, until the marginal profit of doing so is null
(i.e., op=oS ¼ 0). From the latter equation and (8), as well as the first-order con-
ditions of programs (6, 7), we have
eji ¼ ri 1 þ gið Þ  1 ¼ 0 ð9Þ





for every i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; N. This first condition is enough to ensure equilibrium; by
increasing S (when another family joins the group that produces i) profits
decrease.22 The second condition is, given that entry costs are null, the benefits for a
family of producing the ith good shall be the same among groups, that is
pi ¼ pk ¼ p0, for i; k ¼ 1; 2; . . .; N. Therefore, we have N  2 equations, in which
the N prices (pi) may be defined, as well as the size of the N companies (Si).
Let us now consider the case where Z [ 0. From the first-order conditions of















Variable /ji is defined as the substitution rate (of family j when it produces good i)
of working with more people versus consuming more goods, which, when in a state
of equilibrium, should be equal to the rate of increase in income due to working in
larger groups. That is
/ji ¼
gSg M  Sið ÞZPN
i¼1 gjicji
Observe that if Z ¼ 0, then /ji ¼ 0, and /ji grows as Z does. Adding /ji and (8) to
the left side of condition (9), we have
eji ¼ ri 1 þ gið Þ  1 ¼ /ji ð12Þ
while assuming that condition (10) is still met. In the case of Z [ 0 and the model
being in a state of equilibrium, the benefits per family cannot be the same, as the
type of work affects the utility. Those families working in large groups (which
decreases their utility) must receive a higher income. Therefore, with Z [ 0, a
necessary condition for equilibrium requires that the utility of the families pro-
ducing good i be the same as that of the families producing good k, that is,
Ui ¼ Uk ¼ U0, with i; k ¼ 1; 2; . . .; N: Therefore, we have N  2 equations [(12)
corresponding to utilities equal to U0, for each of the N products] and N  2
unknown variables (Si and pi, for the same N products).
22 Condition ðoe=oSÞ\0 implies ðop=oSÞ\0.
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The relation between the size of company i (Si) and the weight of the cultural
factor (Z) is negative, which can be proven with the first-order conditions of the
programs (6, 7) or simply by comparing the balance conditions (9–12): for any
good, a greater Z produces a larger substitution rate / (see 11). To be in a state of
equilibrium, the elasticity eji must increase [given (12)], which can only occur if Si
decreases [given (10)]. For instance, let us assume that there is only one good, as
seen in Fig. 1. The curve with a positive and decreasing slope is the income per
family (p), which, because of (10), is concave. With Z ¼ 0, the maximum exists
where the curve turns flat, forming a company size of SZ¼0. When Z [ 0, the
maximum exists at the point that the slope of the income curve is tangent to the
indifference curve between income and size of the work group. Such an indifference
curve may be derived from the utility function (4) with only one good. Observe that
a higher value of Z will result in an indifference curve that is more to the left, thus
reducing the optimum size of the company and therefore the earnings. This can be
interpreted as the cost (or waste) of following the Cultural Factor.23
4.3 The model and its relationship with cultural patterns of trade
According to the model presented in the last section, the trade pattern for societies
could be affected by the cultural factor of work on a small scale in the following
way: the Cultural Factor promotes working in small groups and discourages
specialization; therefore, ceteris paribus, this type of society has lower priced
products with lower economies of scale, when compared to those societies without
this Cultural Factor.
23 According to Altman (2001), following cultural patterns could have a cost. In this article, the cost is
the loss of efficiency due to the smaller size of the company.
Fig. 1 Equilibrium with only one good. Source: Figure elaborated by the author
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To analyze trade, let us assume we have two communities, A and B, identical in
everything except in ZA and ZB, where community A has the Cultural Factor of work
on a small scale and community B does not have it. To start, we assume that
ZA ¼ ZB ¼ 0. In this scenario, each one of the two communities specializes in
production of certain goods. Their trade allows them to profit from large economies
of scale, which is known as the Krugman result (Krugman 1979; Feenstra 2004).
Now, as will be demonstrated later, if ZA [ ZB, the families of community A will
focus on producing unspecialized goods, with low or no economies of scale. In this









where pNEi ; with i ¼ A; B, indicates the prices of goods with low or non-existent
economies of scale and pEi indicates the prices of goods with large economies of
scale. This is relevant since, originally, trade incentives were the profits derived
from economies of scale (Krugman’s model) but, in this model, these incentives are
the result of Cultural Factor. The next two Propositions will serve to determine trade
patterns:
Proposition 1 In a state of equilibrium, the economy will produce more goods
with greater economies of scale, regardless of the value of Z.
Proof Let S0 be a set of families, and i; j ¼ 1; 2; . . .; N being any of two goods,
under the following condition ri S0ð Þ[ rjðS0Þ. As the inverse elasticity of demand
complies with 0\gi\1, and is the same demand for all goods, then
ri S0ð Þ 1 þ g ci S0ð Þ½ 
	 

[ rj S0ð Þ 1 þ g cj S0ð Þ
 	 

, therefore ei [ ej [see (10) and
(12)]. However, given that / is independent of the production process, given
condition (11), we have /i S
0; Zð Þ ¼ /j S0; Zð Þ, and in particular, /i S0; Zð Þ ¼
/j S
0; Zð Þ for Z ¼ 0.
The above is due to the fact that the individuals are indifferent to producing good
i or j. To be in a state of equilibrium and comply with (10), if Z ¼ 0; or with (12), if
Z [ 0, then Si needs to be greater than Sj, which implies that ci [ cj (the production
of i is greater than j). In addition, since 0\g\1, then pi\pj.
Proposition 2 In a state of equilibrium, as Z is increased, the economy will
produce less of any given good. This effect is more intense when the production
functions present greater economies of scale.
Proof Let S0 be a set of families, and i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; N be any good and let Z1; Z2 be
the weights so that Z1 [ Z2. By (11) we know that /i S0; Z1ð Þ[ /i S0; Z2ð Þ. To be in
a state of equilibrium and to comply with (12), the income elasticity of Z1 needs to
be greater than that of Z2, therefore Si1 [ Si2. In addition, because 0\g\1, then
pi1\pi2. The second part of that statement indicates that the decrease in production
will be greater as long as the economies of scale also grow. Let us compare two
goods, i and j, such that riðS0Þ[ rjðS0Þ. Since / is independent of the economies of
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scale, thus /i S
0; Z1ð Þ  /i S0; Z2ð Þ ¼ /j S0; Z1ð Þ  /j S0; Z2ð Þ, but eiðS0Þ[ ejðS0Þ.
Therefore, Si will need to grow more than Sj to be in a state of equilibrium.
Proposition 1 shows that prices for those products with greater economies of
scale will be lower, regardless of the presence of the cultural factor effect. However,
given Proposition 2, the decrease in prices will be less profound as Z grows, a result
that depends on the Cultural Factor. In the example of the two communities, if
ZA [ ZB, inequality (13) will be met, causing community B to export to A the goods
produced with greater economies of scale and consequently, community A will
export the goods with lower economies of scale to B. Under this scheme, trade
patterns are determined by the difference in the communities’ Cultural Factor.
To illustrate the trade flow more clearly, let us continue with the example of the
two communities, with ZA [ ZB. The horizontal axis of Fig. 2 represents the goods,
ordered according to their economies of scale (from the smallest to the greatest), and
the vertical axis shows relative prices. The price of goods with a low economy of
scale is higher for community B than for A, as the latter prefers to produce them,
thus increasing the supply. Proposition 1 tells us that the price line decreases as
economies of scale grow, and Proposition 2 shows that this line will have a smaller
slope as Z grows (i.e., the price line will have a greater slope for community B than
for A). Therefore, it is easy to see that prices for goods with large economies of scale
and those with lower economies of scale are higher for community B than those for
A. In this scenario, trade exists due to economies of scale, and it is determined by
the differential price derived from the Cultural Factor.
The final outcome is rather interesting. Community A has a free exchange of
goods: each household maximizes its utility function and there are no externalities.
In fact, community A is a Pareto optimum, due to the fact that each family is
maximizing its program (6, 7), given that other families are also optimizing their
own programs. However, since the Cultural Factor affects the economic organi-
zation directly, community A does not take advantage of economies of scale. In fact,
Fig. 2 Price equilibrium with
two communities. Source:
Figure elaborated by the author
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the families of community A could produce and consume more, but the
consequential changes in their level of organization would diminish the utility
function and, therefore, they tend to avoid economies of scale. In conclusion,
community A is at Pareto optimum and, at the same time, is missing out on trade
advantages.
It is possible to observe equilibrium graphically in two societies (A and B) with
two families each and two goods each, C1 and C2, where C2 production has lower
economies of scale than C1 production, whereby the production possibility frontier
(PPF) in Fig. 3 is convex. The representative utility function of the A families is
UA ¼ v C1ð Þ þ v C2ð Þ þ ZAgð2  SiÞ. If ZA ¼ 0, the community does not have the
Cultural Factor, then the balance would be represented by point (3) on the left
graphic of Fig. 3. Once in economic equilibrium, society A only produces item C2
(point 2) or only item C1. However, in the event that society A had the Cultural








In community A, item 2 is cheaper relative to item 1 than in community B. When
trade is a possibility, community A could specialize in C2, but specialization reduces
the utility of members of community A. If ZA is strong, then community A will
produce C1 and C2, and in the graphic on the right, the optimum point is point (5),
and at this point there is no specialization. Note that the indifference curve in both
graphs is just between the two goods and it does not necessarily consider the
expression ZAgð2  SiÞ of the utility function, whereby an indifference curve farther
from the origin does not necessarily have more utility. In particular, the right
graph’s indifference curve has more utility than the left graph’s indifference curve,
since the latter does not take into account the Cultural Factor. We can also observe
that with the Cultural Factor, society A has a higher level of utility in (5) than in (3),
because specializing in the production of C2 only strongly affects its utility, even
when in (3) it would consume more of both goods. In this case, the indifference
curve is between the two goods, but with the second term ZAg 1ð Þ[ 0. This is the
(a) (b)
Fig. 3 Equilibrium with two communities. a Community A without the influence of the cultural factor.
b Community A with the influence of the cultural factor. Source: Figure elaborated by the author
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reason that the indifference curve in the right graph is closer to the origin, but it
represents more utility.
Because community A does not specialize, B is also forced to produce both types
of goods, so B suffers a loss of utility. Obviously, community B looks for other
economies with which to trade.
Finally, we can suppose there are many communities, such as A; B; C; . . .; etc.,
that do not exhibit the Cultural Factor, i.e., ZA ¼ ZB ¼ ZC ¼    ¼ 0. In this case,
trade would result in each economy specializing in certain products, to take
advantage of economies of scale. Now, if we suppose that community A has a
Cultural Factor, i.e., ZA [ 0, whereas the rest of the communities do not, i.e.,
ZB ¼ ZC ¼    ¼ 0, then community A would specialize and would sell goods to
other communities with no economies of scale, and vice versa. However, if the
number of communities is large, and all goods have some kind of economy of scale,
then there will always be another community that could specialize and sell goods
with low economies of scale at a lower cost than community A could. In this case,
community A would have to sell its products at lower prices (or subsidize them) to
buy products with economies of scale.
4.4 Empirical evidence about the cultural factor and trade
In Sect. 3.2, I presented empirical evidence showing that Mexican indigenous
people exhibit the Culture Factor; now I need to show that they sell goods with low
economies of scale. Although there are no data on the type of products that
indigenous communities’ trade, I will use indirect information to show the kinds of
exports of these communities.
Under the assumptions of the model, when there are many communities without
the Cultural Factor, commerce and trade will make communities specialize in
certain products to exploit economies of scale. Indeed, this is what has happened in
recent decades, both in Mexico and the rest of the world, following free market
trade. In Mexico, some industries have grown, such as the automotive industry,
while others have decreased, such as textiles; many companies have shifted
geographically, and the wages by industry have been modified. As indicated by the
trade model presented above, one would expect that these changes be reflected in
the economies of the indigenous communities, depending on the Cultural Factor; if
an indigenous community has a large Z, its economy would continue to produce
goods with small or no economies of scale, regardless of what happens outside of
the community. However, with a small Z, indigenous economies could begin to
specialize.
Table 6 shows the percentage of the EAP in Mexico that engages in different
economic activities. As can be seen, the largest indigenous occupation is
agriculture, particularly subsistence agriculture, which is a type of work carried
out on a small scale, as evidenced by the high self-employment rate shown in
Table 7. However, the production of corn and beans is for self-consumption and the
surplus is sold locally, so it is generally not exported. According to the Census,
flowers, coffee, cacao, fruits and vegetables are the main commercial crops
produced by indigenous communities; they produce these items on a small scale, as
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reflected in their self-employment rate, which is always greater for the indigenous
population than for the non-indigenous population, even when facing the same
economic conditions [Table 6, column Rural (6 States)]. This shows that in these
communities, smallholders produce the commercial crops for export, with a little
economic specialization. Even though these types of production processes require
extra labor at certain times to achieve greater efficiency, anthropological literature24
suggests that, in these cases, the indigenous communities have old practices that are
not monetized and exchange work instead.
The secondary and tertiary sectors have less importance in indigenous
communities than in other societies and, again, in all cases, the self-employment
rate is higher for the indigenous population than for the non-indigenous population.
Crafts deserve special attention; they are the manufactures most often exported by
indigenous communities. It is worth noting that Tables 6 and 7 include data for
persons whose principal activity is the making of crafts; the production of these
kinds of goods is one of the most common secondary activities within indigenous
communities. Here we are talking about products with small or no economies of
scale because their main characteristic is that they are not produced in series.
However, to achieve greater efficiency, it could be possible to take advantage of
economic specialization, and workshops could include several families; as in
previous cases, indigenous craft production has higher levels of self-employment
than non-indigenous production does. For example, in rural indigenous
Table 6 Percentage of Mexican EAP by economic activity








Primary sector 11.1 44.1 32.8 59.9 58.2 74.7
Corn and bean
crops
2.5 23.9 8.0 33.0 25.3 52.4
Commercial
crops
4.1 10.7 12.0 14.3 19.2 13.9
Land workers 4.5 9.5 12.8 12.6 13.7 8.4
Secondary sector 41.5 28.4 34.0 22.5 20.4 14.7
Crafts 2.3 4.7 2.4 5.2 2.0 3.6
Construction 7.0 8.8 9.6 8.0 6.8 5.5
Other 32.2 14.9 22.0 9.3 11.6 5.6
Tertiary sector 47.4 27.5 33.2 17.6 21.4 10.7
Trade 11.4 7.4 9.4 5.2 6.2 3.3
Other 36.0 20.1 23.8 12.4 15.2 7.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: INEGI 2010
24 The anthropological literature reviewed is: Argueta (1995), Durston (1992), Milla´n and Valle (2003),
Warman (1985).
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communities, the self-employment rate is 72.2 %, but the rural non-indigenous rate
is 41.8 %. Again, craft production is under workshop discipline. It is important to
note that, given the importance of this area of production, indigenous people
organize themselves in cooperatives for sale and promotion, but not for joint
production. In contrast, the percentage of the indigenous EAP working in
specialized activities, such as employees or helpers, is always smaller than for
the non-indigenous population, except in the construction sector, in which virtually
all indigenous communities have a part of their work force dedicated to this activity,
either as builders or helpers.
Information about the imports of indigenous communities is scarce and scattered.
According to anthropological literature, indigenous communities generally purchase
products with economies of scale (radios, tennis shoes, etc.) or supplies for their
work (hammers, knives, etc.).
In conclusion, based on the above data, indigenous economies produce and export
goods with small or no economies of scale, such as commercial crops and crafts, and the
self-employment rate is higher than that for non-indigenous communities.
However, it is necessary to compare the types of production among indigenous
communities, to have more evidence about the influence of the Cultural Factor on trade.
The relationship between the rate of self-employment and the ERI was shown in
Sect. 3.2.2. From this, it follows that there is a relationship between the degree of
traditionalism and the Cultural Factor. In this sense, indigenous economies with higher
ERI would have a less economic specialization than economies with low ERI levels.
Subsistence agriculture is the most important economic activity of Group 1, with
55.0 % of the EAP. Group 1 produces very few commercial goods, so trade is
Table 7 Percentage of Mexican EAP self-employment by economic activity
Total Rural Rural (6 states)
Non-indigenous Indigenous Non-indigenous Indigenous Non-indigenous Indigenous
Primary sector 33.8 51.0 34.7 51.4 49.7 60.0
Corn and bean
crops
51.3 60.6 51.3 60.5 60.8 64.0
Commercial
crops
35.3 48.8 36.0 49.1 45.4 55.6
Land workers 22.8 29.4 23.3 29.9 35.1 42.6
Secondary sector 17.7 32.6 19.2 36.8 27.6 39.0
Crafts 40.3 68.6 41.8 72.2 63.8 76.2
Construction 24.0 22.9 18.5 19.2 19.1 20.7
Other 14.8 27.1 17.0 32.2 26.5 33.3
Tertiary sector 25.6 32.1 28.2 34.1 33.5 35.4
Trade 44.9 51.7 46.4 54.3 53.6 52.1
Other 19.6 24.9 21.1 25.5 25.3 27.9
Total 23.3 40.6 27.3 45.0 41.7 54.3
Source: INEGI 2010
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limited. The ERI of group 1 is the highest, and this is also the most traditional group.
The second group has a strong inclination toward commercial crops. It also has the
highest percentage of land workers and the lowest percentage of self-employment in
the production of commercial crops. Thus, farmers tend to hire day laborers, but
when they need more help, they use ancient practices for exchanging work instead
of offering a salary (like the faena). Finally, commercial crops usually are sold to
middlemen who trade them outside the communities. Unlike for the first group, the
economical behavior of the farmers in the second group depends on market
conditions.
Finally, the third group (with the lowest ERI) has the highest percentage of EAP
in the secondary and tertiary sectors. In the secondary sector, crafts are very
important. This group has a lower self-employment rate than the other groups,
indicating economic specialization; something similar happens with the tertiary
sector, in particular with trade. This is evidence of some vertical integration, in
which the craftsperson, with or without hired workers, is part of an economic
process that implies delivery schedules and a possible specialization in one part of
the production process (e.g., sales, or production of crafts with some particular
characteristics). Also, the third group has the highest percentage of jobs that involve
some kind of hierarchy, which are the ones classified as other in Table 8.
The data shown above is evidence that indigenous communities continue to work
under workshop discipline and export goods with low or no economics of scale, as
the model predicts when Z is large. However, evidence also indicates that certain
Table 8 Type of activities and self-employment rates for indigenous groups
EAP type of activity Self-employment rate
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Primary sector 83.0 62.1 41.7 93.9 68.5 74.6
Corn and bean crops 66.0 31.8 19.7 96.1 75.9 87.4
Commercial crops 11.4 17.7 12.2 88.0 64.5 71.5
Land workers 5.6 12.6 9.8 79.7 55.6 52.9
Secondary sector 8.6 21.0 34.6 50.2 45.6 41.6
Crafts 2.6 5.4 8.3 91.2 83.5 77.5
Construction 3.2 7.6 11.8 15.6 22.4 22.7
Other 2.9 8.1 14.5 51.8 42.3 36.4
Tertiary sector 8.4 16.9 23.7 40.8 39.4 44.6
Trade 2.7 5.2 7.0 66.5 69.3 71.0
ther 5.7 11.7 16.7 28.4 26.0 33.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 85.7 58.8 56.1
Percentage of families receiving assistance from relatives who have migrated
National International
0.10 0.94 0.95 1.72 4.23 4.32
Source: INEGI 2010
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changes occur when ERI decreases and, therefore, so does the influence of the
Cultural Factor. These changes are, first, the production of goods aimed at the
market, with all that it implies; second, in some cases, both farmers and craftspeople
have employees and are a part of an economic process; and third, more people are
willing to work in non-family hierarchies. It is important to note that groups 2 and 3
receive help from relatives abroad, as we can see in Table 6, and migrants work
usually under factory discipline.
5 Egalitarian norms and economic growth
Just as the Cultural Factor causes a decrease in the material benefits of trade, it also
reduces economic growth. I analyze this phenomenon in this section.
The section develops an economic growth model that includes the Cultural
Factor. First, I assume that the total economy (indigenous and non-indigenous) can
be represented as an AK model (with human and physical capital). When the weight
of Z is small, the economic growth of indigenous communities (and the total
economy) can also be characterized as following an AK model, as the factors that
keep these communities economically poor could be exogenous, such as lack of
opportunities, discrimination and so forth. However, when the weight of Z is large,
the Cultural Factor influences economic behavior; thus, the economies of
indigenous communities could be characterized as following a Neoclassical model,
with economic growth tending toward zero. In this case, the factors that keep these
communities in economic poverty are both endogenous (like the Cultural Factor)
and exogenous. In this section, we analyze how Neoclassical economies can be
expanded into AK model economies.
With this purpose in mind, I define a discipline index, denoted by h, with
h 2 h; h ; and I express it as h h , where h  is the maximum level of discipline
(factory discipline), and ðhÞ is the lowest discipline index. The expression h h 
will be included in the utility function. At this point, it is important to mention, as I
said in Sect. 3.1, that we understand discipline as behavior in accordance with
certain standards of conduct (Clark 1994); thus, factory discipline implies
acceptance and respect of hierarchies, rigid schedules, division and specialization
of labor and so forth, whereas workshop discipline is understood as the nonexistence
of such terms. As noted previously, this definition of discipline is independent of
work intensity and duration.
As is common in this kind of economic growth model, I suppose a representative
family that wants to maximize an intertemporal utility function. This utility function
is subject to some type of accumulation of economic resources (economic and
physical capital) and restricted by an added production function.
5.1 Added output
Let Y ¼ F K; R; h h   be the production function, with constant returns to scale
in K and R, where K is the physical capital without depreciation and R is work,
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which is defined as R ¼ max h h H; L , where H is the human capital without
depreciation, h h  is the discipline index and L is the labor force, and I assume
that it is constant, L ¼ L.
There are two kinds of production technology: first we have those without any
economic specialization and without hierarchies; production technology may be
inherited from ancestors and/or brought from non-indigenous but unspecialized
economies. Examples include subsistence agriculture, traditional crafts, door-to-
door sales and so forth. Obviously, this kind of production technology does not have
any kind of indivisibilities. The other kind of production technology requires a
minimum of economic specialization, and thus some degree of hierarchy and
indivisibilities. The same specialization induces profitable investment in human
capital, however, basic it may be. This production technology is not necessarily
associated with large-scale production; it includes specialization as part of some
process. For example, production technology can include both traditional and
modern aspects; such is the case of crafts that include marketing (i.e., specifically
designed and custom-made for some sector, advertising, distribution, etc.); some
families work in manufacturing, others in distribution, and so on. Other examples
include some commercial agricultural processes; ecological activities, such as
ecotourism, which are part of some tourist services, and so forth. This technology
can also be used for medium- and large-scale production.
If the representative family tries to work with specialized production, but with a
low discipline index, that is h h ! h, the outcome would be an output without
specialization; in the same way, if the representative family uses specialization, that
is h h ! h, for technology without specialization, it would be, to say the least,
useless. In this sense, there is a level of discipline, denoted by h bh
 
, such that,
above this level, work is more efficient when using specialized production
technology and the investment in human and physical capital will be economically
profitable.
In this regard, if h h  h bh
 
, then h h H  L, and people are not
willing to invest in human capital, and the production function will be
Y ¼ F K; L; h h  . On the other hand, if h h [ h bh
 
then people are
willing to invest in human capital (and develop and/or import new production
technologies), which they will use to increase the production quantity and quality; to
accomplish this, they are willing to accept to work with other people that have some
specialization, and they also accept work schedules and hierarchies, as well as
economic differences between their members. In this scenario, h h H [ L, and
the production function would be Y ¼ F K; H; h h  , and representative family
will invest in both types of capital; i.e., _H þ _K ¼ F K; H; h h   c, where c is
consume. Both types of assets may be interpreted as perfect substitutes, implying
that the profit rates for human and physical capital must be equal (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 2004). When both profit rates are the same and positive, the representative
family invests in physical and human capital, and so the production function will be
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Y ¼ A h h K (see Appendix A.1). This is the case of an economic growth model in
which technological change is endogenous (Acemoglu 2009, Chapter 11; Barro and
Sala-i-Martin 2004, Chapter 4).25 When the production function is
Y ¼ F K; L; h h  , we will call it a Neoclassical growth model, and when the
production function is Y ¼ A h h K, we will call it an Endogenous growth model.
As mentioned in Sect. 2, each society’s culture is what really determines the
importance of cultural factors, which are measured in the utility function using the
variable Z, where Z ¼ 0 indicates no influence and, as we will see later, a higher
h h  value. In addition, the lower the level of Z, the greater the flexibility of the
society will be, regarding deviations from workshop discipline; an excessively high
Z indicates that society has rejected factory discipline, and h h  will have a low
value. For instance, high values of Z would be characteristic of societies with broad
sectors working on a small scale or in small groups, such as Great Britain before the
Industrial Revolution (Clark 1994; Hareven 1991; Smelser 1959; Weisdorf 2006),
or in the indigenous communities that apply egalitarian norms and possess a strong
Cultural Factor.
5.2 The utility function and the maximization program
The main goal of our representative family is to maximize the present value of its
utility function, discounted by the rate q. The utility function depends on the
consumption level ct in the period t, and on discipline index h ht
 
, which
represents the difference between maximum discipline h
 
and the actual degree of
discipline htð Þ. The term h ht
 
represents either the preference for workshop
discipline or the rejection of factory discipline.26 Finally, the intensity of the
Cultural Factor is Z 2 0; Z . The result of this is the following utility function:
U 0ð Þ ¼ r
1
0
eqt u cð Þ  Zg h h  dt
with u0 [ 0, u00\0, g0 [ 0. In the simple growth model, there is a tradeoff between
saving more resources and converting them into capital, so one is able to consume
more in the future, versus saving less and consuming more in the present than in the
future. In this model, in addition to the above dilemma, there is another tradeoff.
According to the previous equation, a greater value of h h  implies a lower
utility, but, according to the aforementioned production function,
oY=o h h  [ 0, which implies an increase in production and more consump-
tion. In this sense, there is another tradeoff between the discipline values and
production: more discipline reduces utility but increases production, and vice versa.
The Hamiltonian of this maximization problem may be written as:
25 The AK model used in the paper has the drawback that physical and human capital can grow
negatively; a similar model that does not have this problem is the Lucas model, but this model addresses
some complications that are not relevant for our purposes.
26 There is some literature about culture in the utility function; for a recent and similar model, see
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010).




H ¼ eqt u cð Þ þ Zg h h  þ k F K; R h h ;  c  ð14Þ
The results of consumption and the degree of discipline over time, for the Neo-
classical case, in which the discipline index is low, i.e., h h  h bh
 
, are
shown in Table 9 (for the derivation of this equation, see Appendix A.2):
The first equation in Table 9 shows the path of consumption, which is the
marginal productivity of capital, minus the discount rate. This expression is
modified by the inverse of the marginal utility elasticity rcð Þ. In the same way, the
growth rate in discipline results from the percentage of consumption growth minus
the capital growth. Since F0K [ 0 and F
00
K\0, eventually, the accumulation of
physical capital will stop being profitable, so that its growth rate will be zero. As the
growth of physical capital is zero, the ratio c=K
 
is constant (see Table 9, equation
T9.3), which means zero growth in both consumption (T9.1) and the discipline
index (T9. 2).
In the case of the Endogenous model (Table 10), first, the expression ; hhð Þ is
zero, because the production function is Y ¼ A h h K, and o2Yoh2
 
¼ 0. Also,












rc\1 and r hhð Þ[ 0, then
hhð Þ

hhð Þ will have the opposite sign to c. In this case, the
discipline is like a buffer or damper of the economic activity; if the economy is
growing, people relax the discipline, but when the economy decreases, people are
willing to accept more discipline, precisely to prevent further economic decline.




will be positive or negative.
Table 9 Solution of the Neoclassical model
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Source: Table elaborated by the author
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As already mentioned, I assume there is a level of h h , denoted by h bh
 
,
such that, below this level, the investment in human capital is zero; whereas, above
this level, the investment is positive. Under the Neoclassical scenario, long-term
growth is always zero, while in the Endogenous model it can be either negative or
positive. As the representative family can choose the type of production function
(depending on whether they invest in human capital or not), they choose the
Neoclassical model when the Endogenous model leads to a negative growth rate,
and vice versa. As a matter of fact, it can be shown (see Appendix A.3) that the
Endogenous model leads to greater utility when the growth rate of capital is
positive; i.e., let s be the time when the economic growth in the Neoclassical model
is zero, so, if
_K
K
[ 0 for t s, then VHt [ VLt, where VHt is the indirect utility
function under the Endogenous model in time t, and VL is the indirect utility
function under the Neoclassical model in time t.
Since the rate of discipline in equilibrium is a function of Z, i.e., h ¼






\0, then high levels of Z indicate a
tendency to continue using traditional technology, and investment in human capital
would not be profitable; in this case, we say that the representative family follows
the Neoclassical model. On the other hand, for low values of Z, the representative
household would be willing to specialize, to take advantage of economies of scale,
to accept or generate new production technology, and hence, to make human capital
investment profitable. In this case, we said the representative family would be in the
Endogenous model. Using this idea, we can build a figure showing the indirect
utility functions in relation to the value of Z. First, we know that
VH Z ¼ 0ð Þ[ VL Z ¼ 0ð Þ, VH Z ¼ Zð Þ\VL Z ¼ Zð Þ and that V ð Þ is continuous;
then, there is a value of Z, denoted bZ such that Z\bZ , and the indirect utility
function of the Endogenous model will be greater than the indirect utility function
using the Neoclassical model.
If we combine what was said in the last two paragraphs, then bZ can also be
defined as a Z such that in equilibrium h h  ¼ h bh
 
. Also, the graphical
representation of the indirect utility function is the upper envelope curve of the two
lines (VH and VL) in Fig. 4.
We can determine certain characteristics of a family in accordance with the
family’s position with respect to point bZ—or what is the same, with respect to point
h bh
 
. When the representative family follows the Neoclassical model, economic
growth is zero, but when it follows the Endogenous model, economic growth is
Table 10 Solution of the
Endogenous model
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¼ A h h   c
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positive. Nonetheless, the transition only implies a small change in the economic
behavior of the representative family. Really, this change has three implications.
The first is a move from zero economic growth (Neoclassical model, equation T8.1)
to very low economic growth (Endogenous model, equation T9.1, in which the term
A h h  q is close to zero). Second, it assumes that the representative household
begins to place greater importance on the use of new production technology, and it
is willing to accept some economic specialization, some hierarchies and so forth,
although still on a limited basis. Third, it assumes that the representative family is
willing to change production technologies, to absorb new knowledge, to accumulate
knowledge and, finally, to spread and expand on knowledge. The transition between
the two models should be smooth. It is basically a change, possibly imperceptible, in
incentives.
The next section shows empirical evidence for the economic growth of Mexican
indigenous communities. The section focuses on the relationship between weight of
Z and the economic growth rate, and the type of economic growth model
(Neoclassical or Endogenous) with which indigenous societies can be analyzed.
5.3 Empirical evidence about economic growth and the cultural factor
The conclusion of the theoretical economic growth model is that, if Z is large,
growth is going to be very slow or non-existent, because communities will not be
making use of economic specialization. In Sect. 3.2 I included evidence that
Mexican indigenous people prefer to work on a small scale (the Cultural Factor),
and in Sect. 4.4 I showed that they sell goods with low economies of scale, which is
consistent with the Cultural Factor. But, if the Cultural Factor influences the
economic behavior of Mexican indigenous people, then, according with the
economic growth model shown in the previous section, this population’s economic
growth must be very slow or non-existent.
Fig. 4 Indirect utility for Neoclassical and Endogenous models. Source: Figure elaborated by the author
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Traditionally, the way to determine economic growth is using data about
production over a specific time period, but this kind of data is not available for the
Mexican indigenous population. Thus, we are going to compare the material welfare
of the indigenous population in two time periods and analyze the differences, to
make conclusion about economic growth.
The first time period is the decade of the 1930s, and the second is the year 2010.
There is a very good study about the lifestyles of indigenous people in Mexico in the
1930s (Basauri 1940); the writer (and/or his assistants) visited almost all indigenous
communities, so he could be able describe the environment, the economy, the
lifestyle and so forth. According to this research, indigenous people lived in rural
communities, did not have access to any public services (like electricity or running
water or pipes) and lived in houses built with traditional materials, depending on the
climate and natural resources available locally. In general, the floors in houses were
not made of cement, the walls were made of adobe, mud, palm, wood or clay, and
the roofs were constructed with straw, wood, shingles or roof tiles with beams.
In the 1930s, it was fairly common for there to be a lack of public services and
for houses to be built with rustic materials, both in rural communities and in cities.
There are no census data available for the decade of the 1930s, but there is
information from the 1950 and 1960 censuses. As shown in Table 11, in 1950, only
17.1 % of houses had running water, mostly in major cities. In contrast, in 2010,
88.5 % of houses had running water, including 78.8 % in non-indigenous
communities in rural area and 70 % in rural indigenous communities. Also, in
1950, only 21 % of houses were built with resistant materials, most located in the
cities or on large haciendas. In 2010, 70.9 % of houses were built with resistant
materials; the rate is 50.4 % for non-indigenous inhabitants of rural areas and
30.3 % for rural indigenous families.
Public services and building materials are better today that those in the 1930s, but
this is not necessarily due to positive economic growth in indigenous communities.
To begin with, the government provides public services. Also, decisions about
house building materials are influenced by customs and adaptation to the
environment; thus, building materials do not necessary respond to budge
constraints. In addition, there are also assistance programs that finance the materials
used to build houses.
Table 11 Public services and house building materials






2010 88.5 70.9 2.58
Rural areas
Non-indigenous 78.8 50.4 2.11
Indigenous 67.9 30.3 1.76
Source: INEGI
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To directly examine the economic growth of indigenous societies in light of
endogenous factors, I am going to analyze domestic commodities, which depend
directly on the budget constraints. I chose to compare possession of gas or electric
stoves and televisions in 2010 with possession in 1960, because there are no data
available for earlier periods. The source consulted for the 1930s does not even
mention the existence of stoves or televisions in indigenous houses. However, as
with public services and other indicators, this was typical in Mexico at the time, as
we can see in Table 12. In 1960, only 17.5 % of homes had gas or electric stoves,
and virtually no one had a television. Currently, 90 % of families have a stove; the
rate is 84.9 % for the non-indigenous population in rural areas, and only 36.9 % in
indigenous rural communities. Only 11.4 % of indigenous households in Chiapas
own a stove, and this rate declines to 8.6 % for Tzeltal communities in Chiapas.
Currently, 93.2 % of households own a television; the rate is 89.3 % in non-
indigenous rural area, and 62.1 % for indigenous families.
After analyzing these data, we can conclude that, on average, the material
welfare of indigenous communities has increased since the 1930s, but this increase
has been significantly lower than that for the general Mexican population.
The differences between communities provide valuable evidence. To analyze the
current situation of indigenous communities, we separated domestic commodities
into basic commodities (gas or electric stove, refrigerator, shower, boiler, washing
machine and telephone) and non-basic commodities (television, cell phone,
computer, Internet access and car). Also, we once again separated communities in
three groups, as in Sect. 3.2.2.
As noted in Table 13, on average Mexicans have 4 of the 6 basic domestic
commodities. Yet, this number decreases to 2.81 in non-indigenous rural areas, and
to only 1.18 for indigenous communities. Group 1, on average, only has 0.41 of 6
Table 12 Gas or electric stoves and televisions
Total Four states with the highest percentage of indigenous inhabitants
Chiapas Oaxaca Quintana Roo Yucata´n
Gas or electric stoves (%)
1960 17.5 3.6 2.0 3.0 5.6
2010 90.0 60.1 67.4 84.7 73.9
Rural areas
Non-indigenous 84.9 59.0 73.8 79.6 73.2
Indigenous 36.9 11.4 40.1 32.7 38.6
Televisions (%)
1960 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
2010 93.2 76.7 76.1 92.5 92.9
Rural areas
Non-indigenous 89.3 80.4 80.8 84.4 94.0
Indigenous 62.1 43.5 57.8 75.6 83.1
Source: INEGI
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possible basic commodities and 0.56 non-basic commodities, even when public
services (such as electricity and running water) are available. Their high level of
self-employment, which means they do not take advantage of economies of scale,
coupled with their limited trade, has led to virtually non-existent economic growth.
In fact, except for government and private sector assistance programs, a large share
of the population of this group lives in the same way as they did in the 1930s.
The second group, as noted in Sect. 4.4, specializes in the production of
commercial crops. In some cases, farmers hire employees; generally, these
employees are also part of a very important migration group. So, the indigenous
communities of Group 2 take advantage of economies of scale, albeit to a limited
degree. Ultimately, they have at least one basic and one non-basic commodity. The
economic growth of Group 2, although modest, has been positive.
Table 13 Material welfare indicators by group
Stoves Basic commodities Non-basic commodities Public services RET
% Mean [0–6] Mean [0–5] Mean [0–3]
Total 90.0 4.00 2.57 2.58
Rural areas 77.2 2.81 1.81 2.11
Indigenous 36.9 1.18 0.97 1.76
Group 1
Tlapanecs 18.9 0.53 0.49 1.32 1.52
Tzeltals 8.5 0.33 0.49 1.73 1.46
Tzotzils 12.3 0.38 0.64 1.91 1.37
Chols 14.5 0.53 0.58 1.81 1.20
Mean Group 1 12.1 0.41 0.56 1.77
Group 2
Huastecs 25.3 0.80 0.83 1.29 1.07
Mixes 39.6 1.01 0.78 1.71 1.07
Mazatecs 26.9 0.76 0.72 1.35 0.94
Chinantecs 38.1 1.39 0.91 1.57 0.91
Mixtecs 37.9 1.07 0.83 1.64 0.91
Nahuas 37.5 1.12 0.99 1.80 0.81
Totonacs 31.1 0.97 0.86 1.84 0.79
Mean Group 2 35.7 1.06 0.91 1.70
Group 3
Pure´pechas 41.3 1.39 1.35 2.03 0.77
Zapotecs 56.3 1.77 1.14 1.94 0.66
Mayas 39.3 1.96 1.38 1.86 0.41
Otomies 71.7 2.05 1.38 2.03 0.39
Mazahua 74.3 1.56 1.36 1.82 0.24
Mean Group 3 53.3 1.86 1.32 1.92
Source: INEGI 2010
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Finally, the third group has the smallest ERI, meaning the lowest influence of the
Cultural Factor. This has led the group to have the highest levels of migration and
the lowest self-employment levels, and to take greater advantage of economies of
scale and significant trade, all of which has resulted in Group 3 communities having
more basic and non-basic commodities than other groups.
Previous analysis does not distinguish between the exogenous and endogenous
factors that affect the economic growth of indigenous communities. To analyze the
origin of the factors, Table 14 includes the results of an intra-community analysis of
economic wellbeing in relation to employment status. This Table shows the average
number of basic and non-basic goods and average quality of housing, for people
who are self-employed, employees or agricultural day laborers. It is important to
point out that most employees in these communities are public workers, such as
teachers, but there are also employees that work in private firms, with similar
incomes in all communities studied and thus the limited disparities for the three
indicators for employees in the different communities, especially in terms of basic
commodities.
I can provide the following analysis: for Group 1, indicators differ greatly for
employees and for self-employed individuals and day laborers. This difference is
mainly due to problems with land tenure, religious conflicts and the consequences of
the Zapatista revolution. As we saw in Sect. 3.2.2, these factors have led families to
own small parcels of land (mainly for subsistence agriculture) and to produce crafts
to have monetary income, so that their income is extremely low. On the other hand,
employees receive a salary and the same benefits as employees in other
communities do. Also, as the degree of traditionalism in a community decreases,
basic and non-basic indicators of welfare increase, as does quality of housing; thus,
the differences between self-employed individuals, employees and agricultural day
laborers decrease.
Exogenous factors affect the whole community. (For example, if there is
discrimination, it is against everyone). However, Table 14 shows that the income of
employees is similar across indigenous communities. This is not the case for those
(self-employed individuals and agricultural day laborers, the most representative
workers in each indigenous society) whose welfare depends on their degree of
traditionalism (i.e., welfare depends on ERI and, therefore, on the Cultural Factor).
If the origin of the Cultural Factor were exogenous, then there would not be a gap in
incomes within communities.
The conclusion of the theoretical economic growth model is that, if Z (measured
in terms of ERI) is large, growth (measured in terms of commodities) is going to be
very slow or non-existent, as I show in Fig. 5. This is because the economy will not
be making use of economic specialization.
So, what happened between the 1930s and today?
First, it is important to keep in mind that the indigenous communities that exist
today are the ones that have made extensive use of their defense mechanisms. Many
others lost their indigenous status because, as they incorporated new production
technologies and new forms of work organization, their members would stop using
their indigenous language and, therefore, in time would no longer be considered
indigenous. It can be said then that current indigenous communities are those with a
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heavy cultural influence (Z). Figure 6 shows the percentage of indigenous
inhabitants with respect to total population, according to census data. We can see
that, from 1930 onwards, the percent of indigenous inhabitants has decreased
significantly, especially between 1940 and 1950; this is due to migration and the
loss of the migrant’s indigenous status. Lack of land, culture and high birth rates led
many indigenous communities to become ‘‘ejectors’’ of people in dire conditions.
Second, the Cultural Factor is a very strong deterrent against growth, and the
differences in growth between indigenous communities and the rest of society
increase directly with economic specialization, which has become more evident
since globalization took off.
Fig. 5 Basic commodities versus the ERI. Source: INEGI 2010 and ERI data (Ordorica et al. 2009)
Fig. 6 Percentage of indigenous inhabitants with respect to total population. Source: INEGI
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6 Economic situation of the indigenous communities
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, indigenous communities have always
been located in the poorest parts of their countries.27 This situation has internal and
external causes. The main external causes are lack of opportunities, discrimination,
liquidity constraints, barriers to increasing human capital and so forth; there are
numerous of papers on this topic.28 There are also several internal causes, such as
the Cultural Factor analyzed in this paper, which is obviously an element that
disrupts trade and hinders economic growth. Given the economic situation, it is
desirable to implement social programs that increase the material welfare of
indigenous communities, but the incentives must be different if communities
conform to a Neoclassical model or an Endogenous model. In the first case, it is
necessary to focus on internal causes of poverty and give communities incentives to
move from the Neoclassical to the Endogenous model. Later, it will be necessary to
focus on external causes of poverty, and give communities other kinds of incentives
so that their economic growth rate will increase.
The first idea that comes to mind is reducing the influence of the Cultural Factor
on trade and economic growth. However, any kind of judgment of the beliefs and
values of indigenous communities, in particular the Cultural Factor, is beyond the
scope of this work. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the effects of these
beliefs and values on the development of public policy. Consider, for example, the
case of Tibetan monks, who have lived in the same way for generations and used
their time and resources to develop their minds. Also consider ecological
communities whose beliefs prevent them from altering their surroundings, and
who live as one with Nature. In these cases, it does not seem right to even
contemplate changing the community’s beliefs. However, when cultural elements
are contrary to certain generally accepted principles (as in the case of the
mistreatment of women) and/or compliance with traditions can adversely affect the
community, then intervention is desirable.
In the next two sections, I present ideas for an assistance program aimed at
increasing the indigenous population’s material welfare. In Sect. 6.1, I assume that
communities follow the Neoclassical model, and the goal is to move them to an
Endogenous model. In Sect. 6.2, I assume that communities already follow the
Endogenous model. I will analyze the empirical case of Mexican indigenous
peoples, according to data collected in Sects. 3.2, 4.4 and 5.3. As we show,
indigenous communities in Group 1 and some in Group 2 have the characteristics of
societies that follow a Neoclassical growth model, while the other indigenous
communities in Group 2 and those in Group 3 comply with the Endogenous model.
The empirical dividing line between the Neoclassical and Endogenous models is
ambiguous; thus, Group 2 is considered to be a border group.
27 See Cornell and Kalt (2000), Anderson and Parker (2009), Patrinos and Skoufias (2007),
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994), Hall and Patrinos (2006).
28 For a complete description of the situation of indigenous peoples, country by country, see Hall and
Patrinos (2006, 2010), and Patrinos and Skoufias (2007). For the United States, see Anderson and Parker
(2009).
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6.1 Indigenous communities under a Neoclassical growth model
Communities in Group 1 and some in Group 2 have the characteristics described
by the Neoclassical model: these societies have a near-zero growth rate (the
evidence indicates that these communities live in almost the same way as they
did in the 1930s, except for changes in public services, as shown in Sect. 5.3),
trade is almost all with products with constant economies of scale and,
apparently, investment in human capital is not profitable, mainly because these
communities have not adopted major technological changes. The reason for this
situation is that the Cultural Factor is very strong (large Z) in these groups, as
evidenced by their high ERI. Also, the social cost of the Cultural Factor is
extremely high, as this cost includes both the poverty of community members
and forced migration. Thus, these communities are in the lowest economic levels
of society.29
Generally, technological change is an appropriate incentive for a community
to switch from the Neoclassical growth model to the Endogenous growth model.
The main argument for investment in human capital not being profitable in the
Neoclassical model is that the technology used does not imply economic
specialization. Obviously, the research and development (R&D) that takes place
in the world involves economic specialization, and R&D focused on technology
with little or no specialization and a small scale is very scarce. However, this
type of technology would be the most direct way to induce a positive growth
rate in communities with the Cultural Factor; in other words, since the growth
rate is defined as c ¼ A h h  q, then a correct incentive would be to look
for an increase in A. Since we have defined A ¼ f H=K
 
, it would be suitable to
develop labor-intensive production technology without economic specialization,
which would lead to investment in human capital being profitable.
Specifically, it seems that the solution to the widespread poverty of
indigenous societies is to create a business scheme where some shared skills
are utilized, subject to their culture. For example, these could include Proto-
industrialization schemes (each family produces a different input), intermediate
technology (technology developed for small-scale work; Schumacher 1973),
small-scale creativity, introduction of business leaders (indigenous or non) into
the community to introduce hierarchies, like a modern ‘‘big-man,’’ and so
forth. Now, I will present two examples of R&D focused on indigenous
communities.
29 The source of forced migration is easy to understand using the Neoclassical model, if we assume that
physical capital is the land used for subsistence agriculture, which is limited, and we assume a positive
population growth rate. In this scenario, capital per capita will be reduced to the point where it would be
impossible to even survive; thus, at this point, some people would have to leave the community. Since
people who migrate are strongly influenced by the Cultural Factor (Z), they have difficulty in adapting
outside of the indigenous community. Given this situation, many migrant laborers live in extreme poverty
(Morett and Cosı´o 2004) or are homeless.
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6.1.1 Indivisible production technology
In the two graphs in Fig. 7, the discipline index h 2 h; h  is plotted (with relation to
a fixed level of Z) on the horizontal axis, versus the indirect utility on the vertical
axis, for both the Neoclassical model VLð Þ and the Endogenous model VHð Þ. Both
curves represent the indirect utility function, for different degrees of specialization,
for a fixed weight Z.
The left graph shows the case of an indivisible production technology, in which
the curve VL represents the Neoclassical model (with no indivisibilities) and the VH
curve represents the Endogenous model, where I assume that this technology needs
a minimum discipline indexhC Zð Þ. Therefore, the dotted sector of the curve VH
cannot be applied, precisely because of indivisibilities. In this case, under a
Neoclassical model, the representative family chooses discipline hA Zð Þ, represented
by point A, because it is the level of discipline that provides the most utility. Note
that the alternative choice is hC Zð Þ, which has a very high level of discipline (large
Z). Obviously, without indivisibilities, the optimum point would be B, which
represents a level hB Zð Þ. This is the case for the dilemma that indigenous
community families face: to either work in factories and submit to factory discipline
(contrary to their customs), thus increasing efficiency, or to work on a small scale
(in their homes or in small groups, using technology inherited from their ancestors)
following workshop discipline, with less efficiency. However, if intermediate
technology is available for the indigenous people, they surely will choose this kind
of technology, they will invest in human capital, and then, they will receive the
material benefits of trade and economic growth.
6.1.2 Small-scale production technology
Small-scale production technology uses modern techniques to work with little or no
economic specialization, such as marketing crafts, production of organic foods,
Fig. 7 Indirect utility versus discipline index. Source: Figure elaborated by the author
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production of specific inputs and so forth. Small-scale production technology is
different from Intermediate Technology in that the latter is a known production
technology but without indivisibilities, while the former is a technology designed
for a small scale. In the graph on the right in Fig. 7, traditional production
technologies are represented by the VL and the indivisible production technology by
V1H curves, with a given Z. In this scenario, the optimum would be at point A for
traditional technology. Suppose there is a new production technology designed to
take into account the weight of Z. If it is possible to design a small-scale technology,
the new relationship between the discipline index and the indirect utility function is
the V2H curve; in this case, the optimum would be B, in which human capital
investment would be profitable. The small-scale production technology is related to
not only the use of physical capital, but also to sales techniques, advertising,
services and so forth. At this point what is really important is not so much
technological achievement, but rather investment in human capital. Obviously, at
this point a community can begin by investing in human capital to ensure that it is
sustainable, which necessarily requires technological change.
This previous analysis has been very abstract. To be more concrete, let me say
the following: There is a vast literature about the relationship between culture,
entrepreneurship and economic growth (Doepke and Zilibotti 2014). According to
this literature, all countries or regions have entrepreneurs (some countries more than
others, in accordance with their culture). In some way, the Cultural Factor that is
analyzed in this paper leads to the absence of entrepreneurship. Thus, assistance
programs could, as a part of their strategies, promote partnership between
entrepreneurs and communities; entrepreneurs could develop new technology
(e.g., small-scale production technology, marketing technology, new types of
hierarchies, etc.) and indigenous communities could produce the items, with their
craft abilities. The entrepreneurs might be in universities and the indigenous
communities in rural areas, but the adventure of working together can produce true
wonders (if also useless things). The key is that the entrepreneurs would be aware of
the Cultural Factor, and they could use their intellect and their imagination to
increase efficiency. The government would then need to provide assistance, money
and financing to reduce the risk to indigenous communities.
6.2 The case of the endogenous model
Communities that demonstrate the characteristics of an Endogenous model of
economic growth, like the indigenous communities in Group 3 and some of those in
Group 2, are willing to invest in physical and human capital, so that programs would
need to focus more on exogenous issues. As we can see in section 4.4, in these
communities, an important part of the EAP works in specialized jobs; these
communities also mainly produce agricultural goods for export, and the sale of
crafts has a degree of vertical integration. However, as we can see in Sect. 5.3, these
communities still face serious poverty. Therefore, there appear to be external factors
that hinder economic development.
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7 Conclusions
The evidence suggests a relationship between the historical circumstances
experienced by indigenous peoples, their current economic behavior and their
poverty. Historically, indigenous peoples have endured colonialism, defending their
land for a very long time and usually losing their original possessions. In response,
they constructed their own sets of institutions and culture, including a very strong
attachment to their land, non-dominant social groups and a social preference for
working in small family businesses (on their lands or in workshops). However, these
institutions and culture are no longer economically viable, so indigenous peoples
generally live in some of the poorest regions in their countries.
The present paper suggests the following hypothesis to link the historical and
current behavior of indigenous communities: During the Colonial period, indige-
nous societies needed to produce a large amount of public goods, mainly for their
defense, so they created and implemented a strategy of social and economic
egalitarianism among their members. Thus, indigenous societies implemented
egalitarian norms, and the production of public goods became more efficient. In the
end, the egalitarian norms became rooted in indigenous culture and were
incorporated into beliefs, values, rituals and so forth.
There are two main egalitarian norms: communal resources and preference for
workshop discipline to factory discipline (or, simply, for working on a small scale).
The first norm has been widely studied, especially since Hardin published his paper
‘‘The Tragedy of the Commons’’ in 1968. This second norm is precisely what I am
considering as the Cultural Factor, associated with the self-employment culture and
small-scale work.
This paper presents empirical evidence to support the existence of egalitarian
norms among the Mexican indigenous population. To do so, the paper analyzes self-
employment factors among and within indigenous communities, including ERI,
which is a measure of the influence of tradition within societies. The result is that
the higher the ERI of a community, the higher its self-employment rate.
The paper also analyzes the effects of the Cultural Factor on the economic
behavior of indigenous societies, mainly in terms of trade and economic growth.
The paper examines trade in terms of the inter-industry trade model developed by
Krugman (1979), with the addition of the Cultural Factor to the model. The result is
a trade model that contemplates cultural differences. However, societies that engage
in trade (both those with and without the Cultural Factor) do not experience many of
the material benefits of trade, although they increase their utility. The empirical
evidence analyzed shows that Mexican indigenous communities mainly export both
agricultural products and crafts, which are products with constant economic scale.
The second model shows that the economic growth of a society with the Cultural
Factor is limited. In fact, it is possible to explain the sources of economic growth
using either a Neoclassical or an Endogenous economic growth model. A Neoclas-
sical growth model can explain the economic behavior of the poorest indigenous
communities, in which the Cultural Factor has significant weight. However, an
Endogenous growth model that considers both physical and human capital can
explain the economic behavior of less impoverished indigenous societies. As in the
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previous case, empirical evidence indicates that higher ERI leads to lower material
welfare. In fact, I also present evidence that the economic lifestyle of some
indigenous peoples in Mexico has not changed between the 1930s and today.
Section 6 suggests some incentives for indigenous communities to abandon traits
that confine them to a Neoclassical model, so that they may move toward an
Endogenous model. Once indigenous communities are in an economic situation that
can be explained by an Endogenous economic growth model, the economic
authorities can use social programs to achieve positive rates of economic growth.
Several social programs have been used with success, as they do not address
endogenous variables that can reduce efficiency, like the Cultural Factor.
As mentioned above, Sects. 4.4 and 5.3 of the paper address empirical evidence
for trade and economic growth models. In these sections, the largest indigenous
communities were divided into three groups, depending on the influence of
traditions within society, measured by the ERI. Group 1 consists of communities
that closely follow their traditions, including the Cultural Factor. This Group has the
highest level of self-employment among the three groups analyzed, and it has a low
utilization of economies of scale, insignificant trade and a high share of subsistence
agriculture, all of which lead to low material welfare. Group 2 has a lower level of
self-employment and a more important share of workers engaged in commercial
agriculture than Group 1 does. The level of material welfare is also higher for Group
2 than for Group 1. Finally, Group 3 comprises the least traditional communities.
This group has an important trade in agricultural products and crafts, and it has a
significant share of workers under factory discipline, all leading to its level of
material welfare being the highest of the three groups.
We can conclude that indigenous communities share the cultural factor it is
preferable to work on a small scale, which can be seen in their high rates of self-
employment. Also, communities with a high degree of traditionalism (that closely
follow the Cultural Factor) have less trade and lower economic growth than less
traditional communities, and thus, they exhibit lower material welfare, as can be
clearly seen in Sect. 5.3. However, as shown in Sects. 5 and 6, it is possible for a
community to have the Cultural Factor and still experience positive economic
growth, because the Cultural Factor is part of the utility function for indigenous
peoples, which implies that it is part of their welfare. However, for this to occur,
technological change is necessary, as I show in Sect. 6.
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Mathematical Appendix
From the neoclassical to the endogenous production function
Let Y ¼ F K; H; h h   be a production function with constant returns to scale on
K and H, thus:
F K; H; h h   ¼ f H
K
; h h 
 
K
Now, if investment in human capital is profitable, then the representative family will
invest in both types of capital, i.e., _H þ _K ¼ f H
K
; h h  K  c. As can be
appreciated, both types of assets may be interpreted as perfect substitutes, which
implies that the profit rates for human and physical capital must be equal. As both




; h h 
 
¼ f 0 H
K
; h h 
 
þ f 0 H
K




Since the function is homothetic, all solutions will have the same ratio rate H=K
 
and we can use this function as a constant, such as A h h  ¼ f H=K; h h
  
(Acemoglu 2009, Sect. 11.2; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, Sect. 4.2). If we sub-
stitute the above equation into the production function, we have Y ¼ A h h K,








¼ eqtu0  k ¼ 0 ðA2Þ
oH
o h h  ¼ e
qtg0 þ kF0 hhð Þ ¼ 0 ðA3Þ
oH
oK
¼ _k ¼ kF0K ðA4Þ
If we derive FOC with respect to time, we obtain the equations in Tables 9 and 10.
In the Exogenous model, cK [ 0 ! VH [ VL
The solutions of the Neoclassical and Endogenous models are as follows:
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cH ¼ c K tð Þ; H tð Þ; h; Z; q; A
 
cL ¼ c K0; H0; h; Z; q; A
 
hH ¼ h K tð Þ; H tð Þ; h; Z;q; A
 
hL ¼ h K0; H0; h; Z;q; A
 
If in t ¼ 0, K 0ð Þ ¼ K0 and H 0ð Þ ¼ H0, then VH 0ð Þ ¼ VL 0ð Þ. As by hypothesis
cK [ 0 then, for t [ 0, K tð Þ[ K0 and H tð Þ[ H0, thus cH [ cL. In this case,
families have more resources, and they can choose the discipline index that
maximizes their utility function, then VH [ VL.
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